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best and disruptive at worst. Following this rationale, many municipal-
ities have issued de facto exclusive franchises to cable operators by ex-
ercising their right to determine the use of such public rights of way as
utility poles and underground conduits. Yet, when challenged by poten-
tial cable suppliers arguing that governments have no right to erect mo-
nopolistic barriers in the form of municipal franchises, the defenders of
cable television franchise monopolies often find themselves unable to
make a convincing economic case for the existence of a natural monop-
oly, or given that case, to connect that argument to their public policy
conclusion that net consumer benefits flow from monopolistic cable
franchising. Using microeconomic analysis and existing empirical re-
search, this Article sets forth a critique of the franchising authority of
local governments over cable television.
I. LEGAL DECISIONS
Local government's franchising authority over cable television is
currently the subject of intense litigation. As one leading legal analyst
in the industry commented, "During any given month, it's hard to tell
whether cable operators or local regulators have the upper hand in the
topsy-turvy world of cable TV- franchising litigation."' Since Commu-
nity Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,2 which established that
municipalities are shielded from antitrust liability only when they have
received and acted pursuant to a dear and direct mandate to regulate
from their respective state governments,' municipal franchising author-
ity has been challenged on both first amendment and antitrust grounds.
In Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,4 a po-
tential supplier of cable television services sued the city of Los Angeles,
alleging violations of the first amendment and the Sherman Act because
the city refused to allow multiple entrants into the cable market.5
While the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
plaintiff had stated a claim under the first amendment and remanded
" Mansell, PCI Prompts Cable Ops to Take Action, CABLE TV L. RaP., May 28,
1985, at 1.
2 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
I See id. at 54 (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389, 413 (1978)); see also Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713,
1719-21 (1985) (stating that the state action exemption shields a municipality's an-
ticompetitive activities from federal antitrust laws even if the activities are only author-
ized, not compelled, and even if the conduct is not actively supervised by the state).
4 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), affid, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986).
5 See 106 S. Ct. at 2035.
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for further proceedings.' On further appeal the Supreme Court also
found a colorable first amendment claim7 although the Court declined
"to express any more detailed views on the proper resolution of the
First Amendment question . . . without a fuller development of the
disputed issues in the case."'
The Ninth Circuit opinion in Preferred Communications recog-
nized the impact of certain competitive market issues on the first
amendment claim. Writing for the unanimous three judge panel in Pre-
ferred, Judge Sneed noted that if competition is physically feasible, a
government's monopolistic franchising poses an "impermissible risk" of
censorship and control.' In deciding that plaintiff PCI's right to operate
without a franchise was protected under the first amendment, the court
stated:
We cannot accept the City's contention that, because the
available space on such facilities [as utility poles] is to an
undetermined extent physically limited, the First Amend-
ment standards applicable to the regulation of broadcasting
permit it to restrict access and allow only a single cable
provider ....
Moreover, PCI has alleged in its complaint that there is
space available on the City's poles and in its conduits. PCI
has alleged that the City has held itself out as a provider of
space on its utility poles to cable television companies and
that state law requires private utilities to make space availa-
ble for the attachment of television cable. . . . Because we
must accept these allegations as true, we must find that the
physical scarcity that could justify increased regulation of
cable operations does not exist in this case."
Judge Sneed cast the cable television business in the mold of an
electronic publisher enjoying constitutional protections."' In this con-
text, regulation through franchising is an impermissible function for
local government because "[a]llowing a procedure such as the City's
would be akin to allowing the government discretion to grant a permit
for the operation of newspaper vending machines located on public
streets only to the newspaper that the government believes 'best' serves
* See id.
See id. at 2037.
* Id. at 2038.
See 754 F.2d at 1409.
10 Id. at 1404 (citation omitted).
11 Id. at 1409.
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the community, a practice we find clearly invalid.""2
In an effort to retain the right to issue exclusive cable franchises,
certain municipalities have constructed a natural monopoly defense of
such franchises.13 These municipalities have been encouraged by Judge
Posner's opinion in Omega Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapo-
lis,"1 which directed the lower court to consider economic findings con-
cerning natural monopoly in adjudicating the legality of a cable
franchise.1 5 The National League of Cities, the chief lobbying agency
for municipal franchisers, claims as its first defense that "a cable opera-
tor is almost always a monopoly provider of cable services for the area
covered by the franchise."1" As Michael J. Henderson finds:
Cities are increasingly characterizing cable television as a
"natural monopoly" . . . . [Miany have advanced the
phrase "natural monopoly" as a justification for stringent
controls over the cable television medium . . . .Some cable-
casters share the view that the natural monopoly concept
permits a municipality to grant the right to provide cable
television services to only one company-at least so long as
they are the ones who have been granted the right to enter
the market.
17
Despite the unsettled state of natural monopoly theory,' s its im-
portance in the disposition of cases involving the cable television indus-
try is illustrated by two recent decisions. In Berkshire Cablevision v.
Burke,' 9 a bidder for a cable franchise sued the state of Rhode Island,
12 Id. (citation omitted).
x William Sharkey defines natural monopoly as a condition that obtains "in a
particular market if and only if a single firm can produce the desired output at lower
cost than any combination of two or more firms." W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF
NATURAL MONOPOLY 54 (1982).
14 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982).
15 See id. at 127.
18 Cable Television Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on SBA and SBIC
Authority, Minority Enterprise and General Small Business Problems of the House
Comm. on Small Business, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1981) (statement of Seattle mayor
Charles Royer, appearing on behalf of the National League of Cities).
17 Henderson, Municipal Ownership of Cable Television: Some Issues and
Problems, 3 COMM./ENT. L.J. 667, 675 (1981) (footnotes omitted); see also Lee,
Cable Franchising and the First Amendment, 36 VAND. L. REV. 867, 872 (1983)
("The assumption that cable is a natural monopoly permeates the franchising and
refranchising process in most communities."); Note, The Evolution of Cable Television
Regulation: A Proposal for the Future, 21 URB. L. ANN. 179, 185 (1981) ("Govern-
ments often refuse to grant franchise privileges to all cable applicants realizing that,
consistent with natural monopoly theory, allowing many companies to commence con-
struction would be inefficient . . ").
18 See infra notes 28-54 and accompanying text.
19 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985).
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alleging that state regulations mandating that cable systems provide
public access and other services effectively abridged the bidder's consti-
tutional rights to free speech and just compensation. In deciding against
the bidder Judge Pettine wrote:
The award of a franchise serves as a rational way of choos-
ing which cable operator will provide cable television service
within a particular service area. Cable operators often com-
pete for a cable franchise but very rarely develop competing
cable systems for the same service area. Such a franchising
system recognizes the economic realities of the cable indus-
try, which, as a practical matter, create a "natural monop-
oly" for the first cable operator to construct a cable system in
a given service area. 0
This view of the cable industry contrasts with that expressed by
the court in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder."1 An
existing cable operator in Boulder, Colorado sued the local government
on antitrust and freedom of expression grounds after the city ordered it
to curtail its expansion while the city began a franchising search for
new entrants into the cable market. 2 Noting the irrevocable injury to
the plaintiff's business that could occur prior to resolution of the con-
troversy, the district court granted plaintiff's request for a preliminary
injunction against Boulder, thereby allowing plaintiff to build freely.23
On the natural monopoly question, Judge Matsch wrote:
I disagree that the evidence shows that cable television is
such a natural monopoly that the only feasible competition is
in the process of currying favor with the City Council to ob-
tain a permit to operate. To the contrary, the evidence is that
there can be competition in the marketplace, with the choice
of price and service left to the consumers. 2 '
The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court opinion25 and was in
turn reversed by the Supreme Court.26 In his Tenth Circuit dissent,
Judge Markey endorsed Judge Matsch's resolution of the natural mo-
20 Id. at 985-86.
21 485 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Colo.), rev'd, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd,
455 U.S. 40 (1982).
22 See id. at 1037. The plaintiff accused the city and one potential competitor of
conspiring to replace the plaintiff with that competitor by revoking the plaintiff's legal
right to operate. See id. at 1038.
23 See id. at 1040.
24 Id. at 1039-40.
25 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980).
26 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
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nopoly question:
The city's sole argument in this case is that because there
can be only one cable operator in Boulder, the moratorium
was necessary to prevent [the plaintiff] from "wiring the en-
tire city" before the city could conduct its bid process and
select what it considered the "best" company to enjoy that
monopoly. Not to put too fine a point on it, that argument is
today simply fallacious. As the trial judge found, and as the
record makes clear, modern technology makes free and open
competition both practically and economically available to
the city by at least four competing cable communicators.2
Clearly, the economic issues in local franchising and regulation of
cable television are both important and unresolved. Perhaps most im-
portant are the issues surrounding the concept of natural monopoly.
How is this economic concept defined? How does it apply to the cable
television market? Is the policy of monopolistic franchising an optimal,
or even a second best, solution to a natural monopoly problem? These
issues comprise the focus of Part II, which explores competitive forces
in both political and economic markets in evaluating the consumer wel-
fare consequences of monopolistic licensing. The conclusion drawn is
that the power of local governments to bar entry of potential competi-
tors into the cable television market creates serious inefficiencies and
cannot now be advanced convincingly as a proconsumer solution to a
private market failure.
II. MONOPOLY: NATURAL AND OTHERWISE
A. The Murky Concept of "Natural Monopoly"
While natural monopoly28 theory is today in a state of flux, econo-
mists have essentially agreed that economies of scale are neither neces-
sary nor sufficient to explain the efficiency associated with a natural
monopoly.2 9 In contrast, nearly a century ago, the existence of econo-
27 630 F.2d at 712 (Markey, C.J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). The majority
differed with Judge Markey on a point of law but did not dispute or otherwise com-
ment upon his economic analysis.
" While natural monopoly may be neatly defined as a market served more effi-
ciently by one firm than by two or more, see supra note 13, this definition begs the
question of market definition, which is crucial. Under this definition, either any surviv-
ing firm is a natural monopolist (using a narrow market definition) or none is (using a
broad market definition). Issues of market definition are addressed in T. Hazlett,
Three Essays on Monopoly 165-74 (1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of California, Los Angeles).
29 See W. SHARKEY, supra note 13, at 17; Hazlett, The Curious Evolution of
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mies of scale was established by some theorists as the sine qua non of
natural monopoly.80 While such economies are sometimes still cited by
regulators to justify certain public utility and other regulatory arrange-
ments, the economics literature no longer recognizes such economies as
logically necessitating the existence of a monopoly. "What favors a mo-
nopoly status for a public utility is not the mere fact that, up to a
certain point of size, it operates under conditions of decreasing unit
cost-an attribute of every business, including a farm or a hand laun-
dry."" At the same time, "a natural monopoly can and often does exist
under increasing cost conditions." 2
Dissatisfaction with the old "economies of scale equal monopolistic
distortions" view was advanced most incisively by Harold Demsetz.33
In arguing that the existence of only one or a few firms in a market
revealed nothing about the actual or potential competitive forces at
work, Demsetz observed "that the asserted relationship between market
concentration and competition cannot be derived from existing theoreti-
cal considerations and that it is based largely on an incorrect under-
standing of the concept of competition or rivalry."' 4
The problem with an economies of scale justification can be seen
in the following example. Suppose that a particular community has a
demand for pets such that only one pet store may be operated profita-
bly. Does this pet store "monopoly" inevitably imply an anticonsumer
result, therefore creating an appropriate situation for government regu-
lation? So long as entry and exit are free, or low-cost substitutes to the
retail pet store are available, the. free market monopoly is thought to be
harmless. If the pet store charges prices significantly in excess of costs,
or refuses to supply services that consumers find valuable-that is,
which are worth more than their cost-competitive entry into the pet
store market in this community would be encouraged. The possibility of
competition or substitution will tend to keep monopoly suppliers honest
and innovative; indeed, economists would predict that a legally enforced
entry barrier, for example, an exclusive pet store franchise, would
Natural Monopoly Theory, in UNNATURAL MONOPOLIES 1, 15-16 (R. Poole ed.
1985).
30 See, e.g., W. SHARKEY, supra note 13, at 15-16 (citing as an example the
nineteenth-century scholar Henry Carter Adams, who "simplifie[d] the definition of
natural monopoly to the purely technical condition of scale economies in the industry").
31 J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 12 (1961).
" B. MiTNicK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION 297 (1980). Even
industries with increasing per unit cost may be naturally monopolistic under this anal-
ysis of one firm can serve the given market more cheaply than two or more, a condition
known as "subadditivity."
33 See Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968).
34 Id. at 55.
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cause prices to increase by diminishing the threat of entry by competi-
tors. Accordingly, a one-firm market may be necessary for the existence
of a monopoly problem, but is far from sufficient. Monopoly is not,
strictly speaking, a numbers game. Consequently, defenders of regula-
tion in the economics literature have shifted their focus to problems
involving long-term investments in specific capital, theoretically an alto-
gether different issue with distinct implications for regulatory policy.35
The current view of economists on the natural monopoly question
is reflected in the "contestability" theory. Under this theory, a market
may exhibit large fixed costs and important economies of scale and still
be contestable, meaning that no tendency towards monopolistic output
restriction is evidenced in open market competition. 8 A contestable
market must have either low barriers to entry or low barriers to exit.
37
Competition in the airline industry presents classic examples of contest-
able markets. To send a Boeing 747 from Los Angeles to New York
involves a high fixed cost and virtually no marginal cost, since the in-
cremental cost of serving an additional passenger is minimal as long as
empty seats remain on the plane. As a result, average cost declines
sharply to the point of full capacity. Yet the high fixed costs that pro-
duce this situation are not sunk. Because the jet may be easily rerouted
to fly from Los Angeles to Honolulu, for example, barriers to exit and,
hence, to competitive entry, are considered to be low. That is, even if a
firm must spend a considerable sum to lease or purchase a 747, entry
into any particular market is inexpensive because airplanes can be sal-
vaged, and vacant seats refilled, without significant additional costs to
an airline.38
The factor on which the existence of natural monopoly most de-
pends, then, is not economies of scale or high fixed costs but capital
salvageability. Where economies of scale dictate one supplier in a mar-
ket, competitive forces will suppress prices to the level of costs as long
as capital is still free to enter and exit. Moreover, free entry increases
productive efficiency by disciplining contestants to innovate and to
lower costs, thereby creating benefits for consumers, as is most poign-
11 See Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 426
(1976); Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-In General and
With Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976). Goldberg, for example, writes,
"The 'justification' of regulation is seen to rest not on narrow natural monopoly (de-
clining long-run average costs) grounds; rather it rests on the long-term relational mat-
ters stressed here." Goldberg, supra, at 445.
38 See W. BAUMOL, J. PANZAR & R. WILLG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND
THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUc:TURE 170 (1982).
37 See id. at 5-7.
" See id.
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antly demonstrated in the post-deregulation airline markets. 9 Even if
the number of suppliers in a particular market does not increase fol-
lowing deregulation, competitive forces more effectively constrain sup-
pliers to act in the consumers' interests.
The case for regulation of public utilities and cable television
franchises must now rest on the contestability, or capital salvageability,
definition of monopoly. The mere fact that so much monopoly regula-
tion has taken place in such certifiably contestable markets as the air-
line, trucking, long-distance telephone transmission, broadcasting, ref-
use collection, and taxicab markets, leads economists to suspect that the
purpose of much monopoly regulation in America may be not to control
monopoly, but to create it.40 Given the ease with which favored eco-
nomic interests in the cable market can reward and hence influence
political franchisers via campaign contributions, editorial influence,
grants of cash or in-kind services to friendly constituencies, private
stock offerings, postretirement employment, and so forth, it is incum-
bent upon those arguing for the creation of legal monopolies to estab-
lish that such franchises would not add to the long list of state-created
monopolies serving very private interests.
In Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,"' the
3' See S. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE DE-
REGULATION 1-3 (1986) (stating that deregulation as of 1983 had led to "at least a $6
billion (in 1977 dollars) annual improvement in the welfare of travelers" and "to at
least a $2.5 billion (in 1977 dollars) annual increase in industry profits"). For a brief
summary of the findings of Morrison and Winston's Brookings Institution study, see
Passell, Flights of Non-Fancy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1986, at A24, cols. 1, 3 (editorial)
(citing the study, which showed that despite minor disadvantages (e.g., an average 5%
rise in travel time and an increase in fares on lightly traveled routes), deregulation had
generated benefits worth about $87 per round trip, and concluding, "Airline deregula-
tion isn't merely a success, it's a triumph of capitalism and common sense that benefits
practically everyone"); Hamilton, Benefits Seen in Airline Deregulation, Wash. Post,
Apr. 16, 1986, at GI, col. 6 (citing the study, which showed that airline deregulation
had resulted in benefits to travelers-one-third in lower fares, two-thirds in more fre-
quent flights).
40 See Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. &
EcoN. 211, 231 (1976) ("[The rational regulator] will seek a structure of costs and
benefits that maximizes political returns."); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regula-
tion, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3, 5 (1971); Stigler & Friedland, What Can
Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1962); Wilson,
The Politics of Regulation, in THE PoLrrics OF REGULATION 357 (J. Wilson ed.
1980). Even where the existence of natural monopoly is relatively undisputed, as in
electricity distribution, an interesting literature has arisen to question the emergence of
proconsumer regulation. See, e.g., Jarrell, The Demand for State Regulation of the
Electric Utility Industry, 21 J.L. & ECON. 269, 276-77 (1978). Jarrell found that state
regulation of electricity rates came first to those states with the lowest electricity prices
(adjusted for cost and demand factors) and that these newly regulated rates quickly rose
relative to unregulated states' rates. Id. at 293.
41 754 F.2d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985), affid, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986). "The City
asserts. . . that, because cable television is a natural monopoly, economic scarcity justi-
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legal importance of going beyond the economies of scale argument was
firmly established by the Ninth Circuit. Citing Miami Herald Publish-
ing Co. v. Tornillo,'2 the court wrote:
[The Supreme Court in Tornillo] refused to accept the
plaintiff's argument that because economic conditions made
entry into newspaper markets difficult, the government could
impose a limited right of access to the press. Although the
Court acknowledged that most newspapers enjoy a monopoly
in their areas of distribution, it did not conclude that this
circumstance gave rise to a duty to provide public access to
the press.
43
The approximately 5000 municipalities"4 that have issued de facto
monopoly cable franchises must pin their hopes on a very liberal read-
ing of Preferred Communications' logic concerning proregulation pre-
cedent: "Several cases, however, have concluded that cable's alleged
natural monopoly characteristics do provide a basis for some degree of
government regulation."45 These cases include Community Communi-
cations Co. v. City of Boulder,46 Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke,47
Omega Satellite Products v. City of Indianapolis,48 and Hopkinsville
Cable TV v. Pennroyal Cablevision.49 The basis for allowing regula-
tion of cable, as opposed to following the laissez faire rule embraced in
Tornillo with respect to newspapers, is that in Tornillo "the character-
istic of economic scarcity was unrelated to a disruptive use of the public
domain requiring a government license," 50 whereas "a cable company
must significantly impact the public domain in order to operate; with-
out a license, it cannot engage in cable broadcasting to disseminate
information."' '
It is essential to define with care the public disruption rationale
fies government regulation .... Id. at 1404.
42 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
" Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1404-05 (citations omitted).
14 This figure is adduced by multiplying the ratio of franchised to unfranchised
systems, as obtained from a Pennsylvania study, multiplied by the number of current
cable systems nationwide, approximately 7000. Kahn, How Safe is Cable's "Natural
Monopoly," CABLEVISION, Oct. 13, 1986, at 60, 61. See Noam, Economies of Scale in
Cable Television: A Multiproduct Analysis, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITON 93, 93
(E. Noam ed. 1985).
5 Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1405 (citations omitted).
46 660 F.2d 1370, 1379 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982).
47 571 F. Supp. 976, 985-86 (D.R.I 1983), vacated, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985).
48 694 F.2d 119, 127-28 (7th Cir. 1982).
49 562 F. Supp. 543, 547 (W.D. Ky. 1982).
Community Communications, 660 F.2d at 1379.
51 Id. This language is cited by the Ninth Circuit in Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1405.
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that Judge Sneed finds in these cases, because it is altogether distinct
from the natural monopoly problem.52 Inconvenience on public streets
and limitations on rights of way may be caused by competitive or mo-
nopoly suppliers and may be eliminated in either a competitive or mo-
nopolistic environment. 5 Yet the cities appear to rely on the public
disruption rationale in alleging that natural monopoly necessitates gov-
ernment franchising of cable."
52 Judge Sneed quickly notes that the Community Communications standard is too
broad.
It suggests that simply because cable's disruption of the public domain
gives rise to a need for licensing, it would also justify the monopoly the
City seeks to create by its auction process. We find it necessary, however,
to undertake a more detailed inquiry into whether the City's auction pro-
cess is a permissible governmental response to the burden imposed by
cable on public resources.
Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1405 (footnote omitted). He concludes that the city's auction
process is not permissible. See id. at 1405-07.
There is every reason to believe that cities and cable regulators fundamentally
understand that the line between the government's interest in protecting public prop-
erty and the government's interest in regulating firms that use such property is a tenu-
ous one. The oft-noted increasing complexity of such regulation is evidence of this. A
recent paper on the subject of professional municipal cable regulators stated:
From its humble origins of exercising police powers over the use of munic-
ipal streets and rights-of-way, local regulatory control of cable has been
extended to such areas as rate regulation, consumer protection, govern-
mental utilization of broadband telecommunications capacity, and enforce-
ment of compliance with the entire range of public services offered in the
heat of the franchising competition.
B. Orton & C. Griffin, Municipal Telecommunications Officers: A Profession Matures
(speech delivered at the Annual Conference of the National Association of Telecommu-
nications Officers and Advisors, St. Louis, Mo., Sept. 29-Oct. 2, 1985).
" As Harold Demsetz has written:
Note clearly: scale economies in serving a market are not at issue. To see
this, imagine that electrical distribution systems are thin lines of a special
conducting paint. The placing of such systems causes no difficulties. They
are sprayed over either public or private property. Nonetheless, suppose
that the use of each system is subject to scale economies. Clearly, the de-
sire to regulate cannot now be justified by such problems as traffic disrup-
tion, even though scale economies are present. "Excess" duplication is a
problem of externalities and not of scale economies.
Demsetz, supra note 33, at 63. Fees, fines, or antidisruption regulations may be im-
posed impartially upon all comers whose activities engender public costs. Such impar-
tial impositions would discourage negative externalities imposed by monopolists as well
as by competitors.
" In a recent brief, the city and county of Sacramento claimed that their right to
issue a monopoly franchise was not proscribed by the first amendment, partly on the
grounds that "[tihe installation of even a single cable television system is accompanied
by traffic congestion, an increased likelihood of accidents, and decreased access to emer-
gency vehicles such as ambulances, fire trucks, and police cars." Appellee's Brief at 47,
Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 798 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1986). The brief
contradicts itself, however, when it correctly notes that "even a single cable television"
installation may cause problems. Id. It may be more difficult for local administrators to
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B. Does the Existence of Natural Monopoly Make a Sufficient
Economic Case for Monopoly Licensing?
The central curiosity in the argument that cost conditions of natu-
ral monopoly mandate a public franchising for cable television is
demonstrated in this syllogism: (a) the market will sustain only one
cable supplier, hence (b) the local government must restrict the market
to one cable supplier. From a public policy perspective, the extraordi-
nary aspect of this logic is the manner in which it loops the first and
last elements of a traditional four-part argument for monopolistic
franchising without addressing the crucial issues.
The general rationale alleged for restrictive municipal licensing is
as follows:
(1) There exist "subadditive" cost conditions; that is, one
supplier has lower average costs than two or more identical
firms serving the same market with the same product, pre-
sumably making monopoly inevitable or "natural";
(2) To prevent the monopolist from charging exorbitant
prices, a franchise will be issued in exchange for the sup-
plier's submission to some form of public regulation of prod-
uct quality and price;
(3) This franchise monopoly will be reliably regulated by
well-informed, efficient, and responsible civic officials and
will give consumers lower effective prices than would exist in
the absence of regulation;
(4) Therefore, the government should, as a matter of policy,
issue monopoly franchises.
By skipping from an economic allegation of natural monopoly to a
policy conclusion endorsing a monopolistic franchise, the syllogism sim-
ply states the nonsensical proposition that governmental power should
be used to guarantee what is already guaranteed by market forces.
Typically, cities do not as a matter of course address the efficiency of
their regulatory scheme because they do not even regulate consumer
prices for cable television. Cities generally have had only the ability to
deny proposed rate hikes in basic cable service." And because cities
supervise and regulate public disruptions caused by two or more firms, but the inconve-
nience of regulators is an exceptionally weak argument for the abridgment of the right
to freedom of the press. Furthermore, it is a distinctively new and curious twist to the
old natural monopoly argument.
55 Robert Entman finds that "[1]ocalities that attempt rate-base of return regula-
tion are rare. Most simply require cable companies to get official approval before post-
ing a rate increase .... Relatively few cities have the time, personnel and expertise for
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have not been able to regulate the services offered, effective price regu-
lation is rendered moot. Moreover, since 1979, cities have lacked any
authority over premium channel prices;5" as of December 29, 1986,
they will have, generally, no power over basic cable rates, pursuant to
the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.5 7 Thus, the traditional
efficiency argument for regulation, whatever its empirical weaknesses,
fails on its own terms. There is hardly even a pretense of price regula-
tion "in exchange for" the monopoly franchise.58
sophisticated rate analysis." R. Entman, Ain't Misbehavin'? Cable Television
Franchising and the Case for Local Deregulation 13 (unpublished paper presented to
the Fifth Annual Urban Affairs Conference of the University of North Carolina, Sept.
28-30, 1983). For instance, during the February-March 1985 period, 284 applications
for basic cable rate increases were filed with local regulatory agencies nationwide. Of
these, 1 was withdrawn and only 11 were denied. Of the 272 rate increases granted,
only 5 were for less than the full amount of the requested increase. In other words,
94% of the proposed rate hikes were granted in full, suggesting a rather perfunctory
aspect of the local regulatory process. See PAUL KAGAN AND ASSOCIATES, INC., CABLE
TV RATE INCREASES, Feb./Mar. 1985 (newsletter). Franchise regulators, however,
may yet depress basic cable rates by either constraining the rate requests to less than
profit-maximizing levels or by delaying rate increases.
5' See Brookhaven Cable TV Inc. v. Kelly, 428 F. Supp. 1216, 1221 (N.D.N.Y.
1977) (upholding FCC deregulation of pay cable rates), affd, 573 F.2d 765 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979).
' The Act states, "Any Federal agency or State may not regulate the rates for the
provision of cable service except to the extent provided under this section." Cable Com-
munications Policy Act of 1984, § 623(a), 47 U.S.C. § 543(a) (Supp. 111 1985). The
statute further provides that any state law limiting or preempting regulation of rates is
to remain in effect only for two years from the effective date of congressional legisla-
tion, i.e., for two years from December 29, 1984. See 47 U.S.C. § 543(g) (Supp. III
1985). Furthermore, deregulation is to occur wherever the Federal Communications
Commission finds "effective competition." See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying
text for a discussion of effective competition.
58 Victor P. Goldberg, in a modem defense of monopolistic franchising, described
a government regulator as a proconsumer agent seeking a long-term arrangement with
a natural monopolist in order to protect customers from monopolists' abuse of their
heightened bargaining power. See Goldberg, supra note 35, at 439-44. Control over
rates is, however, inherently part of the exclusive franchise deal. To Goldberg, the only
real question is whether the service rates are determined initially or are regulated in a
"flexible" fashion over time. He argues that in complex, long-lasting exchange relation-
ships "the parties might find it much simpler and more economical to tailor a 'flexible
pricing' rule to their needs." Goldberg, Toward an Expanded Economic Theory of
Contract, 10 J. ECON. IssuES 45, 50 (1976). Goldberg notes that in monopoly
franchising the regulatory agent "must . . . determine an initial rate structure and
rules for adjusting the structure over time." Goldberg, supra note 35, at 439. Consum-
ers will find it in their interests to have agents regulate franchise monopolies in order to
protect their right to be served at regulated prices: "[T]he customer . . . would like
some protection for his reasonable price expectations against the good faith decisions of
the supplier to terminate or to increase prices." Id. at 440 (footnote omitted)
Nowhere is it suggested that franchising should saddle consumers with monopoly
pricing. Hence, the continuing legacy of the regulation-for-a-monopoly bargain is
somewhat mysterious. Even after it was clear that regulation of leased access and pay
services was impossible at the local level, a Booz Allen study recommended municipal
regulation in the following terms: "Single franchise awards accompanied by appropri-
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It may be useful here to contrast this analysis of the traditional
efficiency argument with that set forth by Judge Posner in Omega Sat-
ellite.59 His informed and informative treatment of the natural monop-
oly issue will be quoted at some length:
The cost of the cable grid appears to be the biggest cost
of a cable television system and to be largely invariant to the
number of subscribers the system has. We said earlier that
once the grid is in place-once every major street has a cable
running above or below it that can be hooked up to the indi-
vidual residences along the street-the cost of adding another
subscriber probably is small. If so, the average cost of cable
television would be minimized by having a single company
in any given geographical area; for if there is more than one
company and therefore more than one grid, the cost of each
grid will be spread over a smaller number of subscribers,
and the average cost per subscriber, and hence price, will be
higher.
If the foregoing accurately describes conditions in Indi-
anapolis-again a question on which .the record of the pre-
liminary injunction proceeding is sketchy at best-it de-
scribes what economists call a natural monopoly, wherein
the benefits, and indeed the very possibility, of competition
are limited. You can start with a competitive free-for-
all-different cable television systems frantically building out
their grids and signing up subscribers in an effort to bring
down their average costs faster than their rivals-but eventu-
ally there will be only a single company, because until a
company serves the whole market it will have an incentive to
keep expanding in order to lower its average costs. In the
interim there may be wasteful duplication of facilities. This
duplication may lead not only to higher prices to cable televi-
sion subscribers, at least in the short run, but also to higher
costs to other users of the public ways, who must compete
ate regulation produce uniform services to subscribers at reasonable cost .... Sub-
scriber rates and service levels are coming under increasingly stringent monitoring and
control." Booz Allen, Analysis of Overlapping Franchises, Overbuilding, and Dividing
Urban Markets in the CATV Industry for Cable Atlanta, Inc. and Georgia Cablevi-
sion Corp. IV-19 (Oct. 9, 1979) (unpublished report) (capitalization omitted). Al-
though the study's predictions were poor (regulation of rates and of services has virtu-
ally disappeared, see supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text), there has been no
great change in the views or arguments of the franchising advocates, thus suggesting a
lack of seriousness in the economic case advanced by profranchising interests.
59 Omega Satellite, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982).
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with the cable television companies for access to them. An
alternative procedure is to pick the most efficient competitor
at the outset, give him a monopoly, and extract from him in
exchange a commitment to provide reasonable service at rea-
sonable rates.60
This, in elongated form, is three-quarters of the four-part argu-
ment presented above," as adapted to cable. Logical requirements,
however, still remain unsatisfied-as Judge Posner points out clearly
within his Omega Satellite opinion (and elsewhere). The finding of
economies of scale is necessary but clearly insufficient to establish the
case for monopoly licensing by governments. Posner rounds out the
analysis as he notes that the plaintiff petitioning for open cable compe-
tition "may be able to prove that the City officials were not acting in
the consumer interest, that cable television in Indianapolis is not a nat-
ural monopoly, that exclusive franchising is a needlessly restrictive way
of dealing with natural monopoly .... -62
Elsewhere Posner has been quite specific about the consumer
problems inherent in publicly let franchise monopoly. In his important
article Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation,6 3 Posner challenges the
traditional rationale for government regulation of natural monopoly:
Much criticized in the details of its application, regulation is
assumed by nearly all who work or write in the field, as by
the public in general, to be fundamentally inevitable, wise,
and necessary. However, personal experience as a govern-
ment lawyer involved in regulatory matters made me skepti-
cal about the validity of the assumption and this study has
convinced me that in fact public utility regulation is probably
not a useful exertion of governmental powers; that its bene-
fits cannot be shown to outweigh its costs; and that even in
markets where efficiency dictates monopoly we might do bet-
ter to allow natural economic forces to determine business
conduct and performance subject only to the constraints of
antitrust policy.6 '
60 Id. at 126. The idea that duplication of facilities may lead to higher short-run
prices to subscribers is incorrect analytically because only marginal costs help to deter-
mine price, not historic or "sunk" costs. See infra note 73.
*1 See supra text following note 54.
62 Omega Satellite, 694 F.2d at 127.
63 Posner, Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548 (1969).
Id. at 549. Of course, scholarly opinion concerning the appropriateness of regu-
lation has changed somewhat dramatically since Posner wrote this essay in 1969, in
part because of this important article and Posner's subsequent work on the question.
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Posner concludes, "The benefits of regulation are dubious, not
only because the evils of natural monopoly are exaggerated but also
because the effectiveness of regulation in controlling them is highly
questionable. ' 65 But more important than his conclusion, for the pur-
poses of this Article, is Posner's premise: that regulation of alleged nat-
ural monopoly is not justified merely by the presence of economies of
scale. In challenging an idea so firmly lodged in the minds of regula-
tory personnel in 1969, Posner's critique revealed that the economies of
scale argument simply assumed the need for regulation. Upon exami-
nation, the case against natural monopoly was not, also, a case for reg-
ulation. Posner's analysis of the natural monopoly issue soon led him to
reject the "regulation is efficient" hypothesis in examining the monopo-
listic franchising of cable television:
At the municipal level, where cable regulation has usually
taken the form of conditioning permission to use public
rights of way upon the franchisee's agreement to rebate a
portion of his gross revenues and provide free service to the
city, the thrust of cable regulation has not been to limit mo-
nopoly profits, but, much more dubiously, to divert a portion
of those profits to the public purse. We must inquire
whether the present character of municipal regulation of
cable television is accidental and easily remediable, or the
result of more or less inherent conditions of local govern-
ment. I suspect the latter is the case.66
Clearly, the existence of economies of scale is an insufficient basis
for regulation on economic efficiency grounds. Yet, in legislative hear-
ings and court testimony, municipalities equate proving the need for
regulation with proving the existence of natural monopoly.67 The re-
cent explosion of academic interest in the consumer welfare aspects of
regulation provides a measure of the considerable range of issues en-
tirely overlooked by the economies of scale defense of regulation.,
Accordingly even where the natural monopoly case is convincingly
made, it alone is an inadequate criterion upon which to base the
85 Id. at 635.
88 Posner, The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television
Industry, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MGmT. Scr. 98, 123 (1972).
67 Mark S. Nadel presents the standard rationale: "[B]ecause cable distribution
exhibits characteristics of a natural monopoly, the locality usually awards only a single
franchise for each area." Nadel, COMCAR A Marketplace Cable Television Franchise
Structure, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 541, 545-46 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
88 For a collection of essays addressing some of( these issues, see UNNATURAL MO-
NOPOLIES, supra note 29.
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franchise monopoly case. It must first be demonstrated that the public
franchising authority is in a better position to realize the benefits of
monopoly organization than the private marketplace, and that the polit-
ical authorities know which private monopoly should receive the
franchise. As the economies of scale argument assumes no difference
between firms, there is, of course, no choice to make. The real world,
however, offers no such comforting simplicity.
1. The Costs of "Ruinous" Competition
The notion that free competition will invite wasteful overinvest-
ment with ruinous results and dog-eat-dog price wars is an old canard
invoked by economists seeking to justify municipal monopoly franchis-
ing already in place.69 Two unanswered questions are posed by the
logic of this notion: (1) why do private investors need to be protected
from financial ruin? and (2) what, conversely, is the magnitude of the
wasteful competition that political auctions bring forth?
To argue that self-interested business persons, risking their own
dollars and reputations, are less able to recognize ruinous competition
than city council members who do not directly realize any profit or loss
is a curious economic theory, indeed. The very idea of regulators trying
to save an experienced cable competitor, much against its will, from a
disastrous fate, is itself testimony to the level of incredulity this theory
would garner among professional economists. The simpler and more
direct point is that the policy of regulation, or monopoly franchising,
has never been publicly advocated to save capitalists at the expense of
consumers. The fact that many, if not most, of today's competitors in
the personal computer market, for instance, will not survive the dec-
ade70 is a wholly insufficient basis for erecting governmental barriers to
entry. The entrepreneur, it is thought, best knows how to evaluate
risky ventures. Moreover, the consumer clearly benefits from competi-
tion between rival businesses to become one of the few or only market
69 See Hazlett, supra note 29, at 2-11.
70 See, e.g., Schrage, Computer Industry Slump is Broad, Deep, Wash. Post,
June 30, 1985, at G1, col. 2, G2, col. 5 (citing as one factor causing the crisis in the
computer industry the entry of many new companies, which has led to overbuilding
and overcapacity. "Clearly, so many competing companies just can't survive. The pain
of the industrywide shakeout . . . has afflicted all industry players as all the competi-
tion has compressed profit margins further."); Pollack, As a Computer Market Frays;
Osborne Just One Symbol of Problem, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1983, at D1, col. 3 (stat-
ing that crisis in personal computer market is due primarily to too many suppliers with
similar products (there are an estimated 150 companies in the personal computer busi-
ness) and to the increasing dominance of IBM, which entered the personal computer
market in 1981).
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survivors.71 Competition inevitably involves duplication costs,72 but long
years of observation have convinced economists that the benefits of al-
lowing consumers to choose the winners, as opposed to allowing politi-
cians or government planners to select the firms that they believe con-
sumers would (or should) choose, are, generally speaking, greater than
the costs of consumer choice.
In any event, it is not the purpose of public franchising to protect
irrational investors to the detriment of consumers. Once overbuilding
increases the available supply of services, it can only decrease the price
of such services."3 Yet, in fact, regulators have decried rivalries between
direct competitors leading to rate wars. The benefit to consumers in
such wars is undeniable;"' critics can only point to the arguably short-
run nature of lower prices. The worst outcome for consumers, of
course, is the elimination through competition of all but one survivor:
just the result that municipal franchising agencies routinely seek to
7' Indeed, Judge Posner notes that antitrust law respects the right of rivals to
compete for the market, "that is, competition to be the firm to enjoy a natural monop-
oly." Omega Satellite, 694 F.2d 119, 127 (7th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). Similarly,
in Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961), the circuit court noted that competition be-
tween newspapers competing for a natural monopoly might be good for the consuming
public: "[W]e cannot say that it could not be in the public interest to have one newspa-
per rather than another. Where there is no identity of performance we will not say that
the public does not have an interest in competition even though that competition be an
elimination bout." Id. at 584 n.4. It is crucial to note that this open entry competition
for the market is entirely distinct from a publicly held auction for the right to serve the
market, in that firms compete directly for consumers' favor, not for the good will of
local politicians. See Owen, Recent Developments in Cable Television Regulation,
REGULATORY REFORM: INDUS. REG. COMM. NEWSL., Dec. 1985, at 4 (published by
the Industry Regulation Committee of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law) ("There is
nothing inherent in th[e] definition of natural monopoly that would permit one to draw
the conclusion that the competitive process should not be allowed to operate in the
usual way to benefit consumers.").
72 If there were no duplication costs involved in a rivalry between firms, the firms
would not be competing directly in the same market-that is, they would not be actu-
ally competing. Hence, duplication is a definitional component of direct competition.
73 Even Judge Posner errs in stating, "[W]asteful duplication of facilities . . .
may lead . . . to higher prices to cable television subscribers, at least in the short run."
Omega Satellite, 694 F.2d at 126. The error is the famous "sunk cost fallacy"; once
resources have been committed to a market, only their marginal cost affects supply,
and hence, price. If duplicate investment could raise prices then incumbent monopolists
would not have to worry about overbuilds, and head-to-head competition would be the
typical case. Proponents of municipal franchising, of course, argue that prices will not
sustain the investments of two or more competitors, thus rejecting, if implicitly, this
erroneous sunk-cost reasoning.
74 A study for the city of Denver found that "[o]ne of the notable advantages for
consumers in an overbuild situation is that service rates are competitive and therefore
likely to be relatively low." Touche Ross & Co., Financial and Economic Analysis of
the Cable Television Permit Policy of the City and County of Denver 28 (Jan. 20,
1984) (unpublished study).
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impose.
If the demand for cable services is sufficient to make their provi-
sion profitable, the assertion of economies of scale begs the monopoly
franchise question: what imbues the public franchising authority with
the prescience to select the one firm offering the optimal mix of services
over all submarkets in the franchise area? If the government could em-
ploy accountants, analysts, planners, and other experts to predict effec-
tively the economic results of competitive markets, there would be no
need for private capital markets to decide where society's investments
should be made. Private firms as well as the government must them-
selves rely on projections of uncertain futures. But private markets
boast two primary means to protect consumers: first, entrepreneurs who
fail to meet the demands of buyers efficiently (or to pay competitive
wages and returns on capital) lose their resources; second, competing
entrepreneurs with better ideas are free to enter and capture the mar-
ket. In other words, a policy of free entry and exit obliges any survivor
to improve the opportunities available to consumers and other economic
agents.
7 5
In its proregulation decision in Berkshire Cablevision, the district
court maintained:
[G]overnment franchising of the cable television industry is
virtually indispensible. For example, since constructing a
cable television system requires use of the public streets or
telephone poles, the government has a substantial interest in
limiting the number of cable operators who build cable
systems.
Of course, the flip side to government franchising is that
it insulates cable operators from unnecessary competition.
The award of a franchise serves as a rational way of choos-
ing which cable operator will provide cable television service
71 Economist Bruce M. Owen concludes of the cable market:
The competitive process is an important guarantee that the particular firm
that does end up as the monopolist is in fact the most efficient and respon-
sive seller. There is a world of difference between the performance that
one would expect of a monopolist that survived a competitive struggle to
serve its customers and what one expects of a monopolist that is granted a
franchise that frees it through state action of any fear of competition. ...
[T]here is nothing inevitable about the identity of the monopolist in an
industry that is a natural monopoly. That is, in many industries most effi-
ciently composed of a single firm, performance is improved if that firm is
subject to being replaced by another as the franchisee in the event that its
prices are too high or its performance inferior.
Owen, supra note 71, at 4.
1986]
1354 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
within a particular service area.7 6
This version of the wasteful duplication argument fails to recog-
nize that unnecessary competition is in the eye of the beholder. Any
owner of monopoly rights believes that competition to dissipate his eco-
nomic rents is unnecessary; furthermore, the "rational way of choos-
ing" a monopolist has instant appeal to those economic actors favored
by the "rational" selection process. But the case for efficiency must rest
on some general interest served thereby, and the profranchising view
refuses to address, let alone establish, the existence of such an interest.
In order to justify monopoly licensing, it is apparently sufficient to la-
bel competition for a cable system in an open, unfranchised market as
unnecessary, without further elaboration of its consumer welfare
consequences.
Most fundamentally, the subjective nature of the political choice is
ignored. Asserting that regulators can arrive at a solution by picking
the best supplier through a rational method obscures all the essential
elements of the choice itself. Indeed, public franchising vests politicians
with the incredibly complex task of foreseeing consumer demands and
new technologies, and of evaluating alternative supplies, efficient pro-
duction methods, and an infinity of abstruse data, while giving them no
financial incentive to choose well. In addition, rival suppliers are
barred from entering the market to fulfill unsatisfied demand should
the politicians make the wrong choice. Moreover, the cable television
market poses more difficult challenges for the regulator than do many
other industries. Although federal regulation of interstate trucking and
air travel, for instance, is now deemed a consumer welfare failure77 at
least those industries presented relatively well known and stable tech-
nologies, outputs, and demands. As noted in an essay concerning federal
deregulation of cable television:
[T]he task of supplying reasonably accurate information
about how many common-carrier truckers will at what
prices be serving Grand Rapids, Michigan, as a result of de-
regulation is easy when compared to the task of predicting
how many over-the-air and cable broadcast facilities will be
located in Grand Rapids, supplying at prices to be predicted
what character of programming to what fractions of the pop-
ulation from what local origination, network, syndicated, or
distant-signal sources as a result of a yet-to-be specified sub-
78 Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. 976, 985-86 (D.R.I. 1983) (citations omit-
ted) (emphasis added).
"' See infra note 125.
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set of deregulation proposals, using a technology that may
well evolve in new directions as a consequence of whatever
policy change is made.
78
2. An Example of Healthy Competition in a
Declining Unit Cost Industry
Analogies to the telephone, electric, gas, and water utility indus-
tries proffered by advocates of monopoly licensing in cable franchising
gloss over important assumptions within a natural monopoly argument.
Assertions that cable television possesses the high fixed (or sunk) cost
and low variable cost attributes of other distributional natural monopo-
lies do not adequately address serious competitive issues. For instance,
with respect to the important firm homogeneity assumption embodied
in the natural monopoly argument, distributional industries with high
fixed costs often actually prosper, in the consumer welfare perspective,
from a competitive open entry policy that allows differentiated firms
with diminishing per unit costs to battle freely for consumers' dollars.
The overnight mail delivery market instantly springs to mind as
an example of healthy competition in a declining unit cost industry. 9
The vast, worldwide distribution service of an established incumbent
should theoretically constitute an insurmountable barrier to all prospec-
tive entrants."' All newcomers must undertake to duplicate all local of-
fices, delivery routes, advertising and marketing efforts, and sorting fa-
cilities of the existing monopolist, while merely splitting the market's
78 Besen, Mitchell, Noll, Owen, Park & Rosse, Economic Policy Research on
Cable Television: Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Cable Deregulation, in DEREGU-
LATION OF CABLE TELEVISION 45, 49 (P. MacAvoy ed. 1977) (footnote omitted).
7' Lest it be alleged that the post office analogy creates a straw man, let us note
that franchising advocates have advanced the example themselves. In pleading for mu-
nicipal control of cable, the city and county of Sacramento allege, "The obvious legal
analogy is the post office or the telephone system, both of which are now regulated as
common carriers." Appellees' Brief, supra note 54, at 42. Curiously, both markets cited
are ones in which alleged natural monopoly cost conditions have justified governmen-
tally imposed entry barriers that are today seen as injurious to consumer welfare. For a
discussion of the postal market, see infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. The long
distance telephone market is now seen as entirely contestable, although competitive mi-
crowave technologies, available since the 1940's, have been'stifled by promonopoly reg-
ulation. Importantly, such competition is now seen as feasible and proconsumer, despite
large fixed investments that presumably dictate downward-sloping average cost curves
in production.
80 Furthermore, any potential entrant may be assured that the incumbent will not
exit: even if operating at a loss, the United States Postal Service would almost surely
continue to operate through cross-subsidies or Treasury payments, as in past years.
This makes entry riskier than where the incumbent is privately owned and thus more
likely to exit a tight market.
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customers. An accounting study would clearly demonstrate that a mo-
nopolist could serve the entire overnight mail delivery market at a
lower per unit cost than two or more firms (i.e., overbuilt competitors)
of identical efficiency. Such a hypothetical study, of course, precisely
mirrors the natural monopoly argument made by cable franchising
authorities.
The fortune made by Federal Express and other competitors of the
natural monopoly of the United States Postal Service powerfully attests
to the tenuousness of the homogeneity presumption. Firms may be af-
forded profitable opportunities to compete in declining average cost in-
dustries where quality differences are important.8 Theoretically, it
would still be better-that is, more efficient-for regulators to observe
the shortcomings of an incumbent monopolist and to direct that mono-
polist's movement in the appropriate welfare-maximizing direction.
Unfortunately, such observations are best made within the context of
openly competitive markets, where actual market efficiencies are relia-
bly recorded in profit and loss statements. Thus, the accounting study
conclusions that fixed or sunk costs are high and that, as a result, a
market is most cheaply served by one supplier, are wholly insufficient
as premises upon which to prohibit competitive entry.
Most importantly, the postal example aids in understanding the
dynamics of franchising by revealing the unpredictability of unregu-
lated entry. While consumer selection has now proved the virtue of
competitive entry, suppose that in 1975 a regulatory board was charged
with deciding on a nationwide overnight postal franchise. Should it
have imposed a monopoly franchise solution, selecting the best single
supplier, or alternatively, adopted an open entry policy? The natural
monopoly argument could certainly have been advanced; a monopoly
franchise could have been promoted as the rational means of eliminat-
ing unnecessary competition. The regulator's quandary would have lain
in discerning necessary from unnecessary competition ex ante. What
means would have been available to divine the optimal market struc-
ture and number of firms, their desired product output, or their owner-
"' See, e.g., Apcar, For Post Office, Overnight Mail Service is Absolutely, Posi-
tively Not So Easy, Wall St. J., June 12, 1985, at 33, col. 3. While Federal Express
commands at least 40% of overnight mail delivery market and the Post Office's Express
Mail about 33%, "a host of upstart carriers, sensing vulnerability in their government-
sponsored competitor, acknowledge they are targeting Express Mail customers to in-
crease their own market share." Id. These competitors rely on differences between their
services and the Post Office's to attract customers: the private services pick up (the Post
Office does this only at an extra charge); the services can easily trace lost packages (the
Post Office process can require ten days); the services promise delivery by the next
morning (the Post Office, by 3 p.m.), and so forth. See id. at cols. 3-5.
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ship? The overnight mail delivery example provides a vivid demonstra-
tion of the advantages of allowing market competition to regulate entry,
even in industries in which presumed cost conditions lead regulators to
discount the potency of competing, "unnecessary" entrants.
3. The Costs of Municipal Regulation
Whatever the cost to discover the correct number, size, identity,
inputs, outputs, production functions, and price schedules of cable tele-
vision suppliers through market competition, any proper analysis of
monopoly franchising must compare this cost to the alternative cost of
political licensing. There is no cost-free alternative available. Public
franchising via monopoly auction will not costlessly end wasteful com-
petition but will simply shift such competition to a different set of mar-
ket demanders. Competitors will repackage their products to court these
new consumers. Enormously expensive franchising campaigns have
plagued the cable industry,82 as have serious delays, political corrup-
tion, overpromising by cable companies, and postfranchise haggling
over contract terms." Because the costs of awarding and regulating
82 During the competition to obtain the 226,000 home franchise issued by the city
of Denver in 1982, the New York Times reported:
So far, the [three] companies have spent nearly $1 million apiece
competing for the lucrative 15-year contract and have waged intense ad-
vertising, lobbying and promotional campaigns aimed at winning the sup-
port of civic leaders, community organizations and minority groups.
All of the companies have pledged millions of dollars to support local
programming and community-access channels, including providing as
many as 26 fully equipped studios scattered through the city. Tele-
prompter has proposed to turn over 20 percent of the franchise to the city
government, which would hold it as a charitable trust.
Schmidt, Millions Spent in Contest for 'Showcase' Denver Cable Contract, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 22, 1982, at A12, cols. 2, 4. A study commissioned by the city soon after
the award was made concluded that the franchisee had committed itself to supply
double the channel capacity required to serve consumer demand fully, leading to an
overinvestment costing roughly $8 million. Touche Ross & Co., supra note 74, at 39-
41. Even a false start, when a city decides not to choose any franchisee, can be highly
costly. In Philadelphia, which decided to begin its franchising process anew in 1984,
"[flinancial reports filed with the city show that the cable companies spent about $6
million since August 1982 to prepare and promote the proposals that were rejected
yesterday." Wolf, After Three False Starts, Cable Firms are Leery of Phila., Phila.
Inquirer, Jan. 26, 1984, at 10-A, cols. 1, 3.
83 See Williamson, supra note 35. In discussing the problem of franchise awards,
Mark S. Nadel writes:
The principal difficulty with this procedure is that it requires politi-
cal bodies to make highly subjective judgments based on ambiguous multi-
ple standards. There is trdmendous pressure on applicants to expend their
resources on political maneuvering and to make unrealistic promises con-
cerning rates and technical features. Resources also are normally allocated
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franchise monopolies are significant, the mere assertion that the free
market cannot costlessly achieve an equilibrium is insufficient to estab-
lish a prima facie case for monopoly franchising.
The most problematic political cost of regulation springs from the
incentive for public authorities to create durable monopolistic profit op-
portunities. The calculus is straightforward: where voters are rationally
ignorant in the sense that it would cost them more to become intimately
familiar with every detail of local government than their vote is likely
to be worth to them; where municipal issues are many, and where
terms of office-holders are staggered such that there is no single refer-
endum on the cable television franchise decision (even one implicit
within the platforms of candidates), then local politicians will have an
incentive to make their cable franchise decision, at least in part, on the
basis of special interest considerations.8" This leads the franchising au-
to public service offerings of the system, without any evaluation of
whether the benefits derived from offering these services justify the costs.
Nadel, supra note 67, at 547 (footnotes omitted). Leading industry consultants have
recently characterized the process as follows:
- "The competition was just like any other auction, and companies felt
they had to outbid each other, at any cost, just to win the
franchises ....
Then, after the franchise was won, they started to worry about build-
ing what they had promised . . . they tried to convince cities that the
systems should be scaled back." (statement of Carl Pilnick)
- "It didn't matter if one company promised 16 [local origination] studios
and another promised 17, both clearly in excess of what a city might
need .... What mattered was winning." (statement of Howard Gan)
- "Cities tried to turn cable into a political football . . . to milk the
industry for all it was worth. . . . Companies knew they were being
pressured into unrealistic concessions, but they had to play along." (state-
ment of Paul Kagan)
Getlin, Cable TV: A New Season of Austerity, L.A. Times, Jan. 5, 1985, at I-1, col. 1,
24, col. 1. The writer notes, interestingly, that "[w]hile many local officials have in-
sisted that companies honor their promises, virtually every cable firm seeking such
changes has won concessions." Id.
" The screen between voters and the cable franchise decision is not easily pene-
trated. As a first step in closely monitoring politicians, voters would have to be fully
informed as to all applicants responding to the city's "request for proposals" (RFP) in
order to judge their representatives' proconsumer sentiment. In fact, great knowledge of
all possible cable applicants and product mixes would be necessary for a well informed
voter, because RFPs and the resultant applications are inherently biased toward the
political concerns of incumbent representatives. This is an enormous information re-
quirement. Gathering good information is very difficult even for the public officials
who must vote on the franchise selection, because extensive research is required as to
what could be supplied in the local cable market if the political authorities did not
franchise cable at all. A state investigator describes the typical situation:
Few public servants, elected or appointed, have the time or background to
understand fully what cable television will mean to their communities. Lo-
cal government frequently calls in consultants to develop needs assessments
and to evaluate the responses to the request for proposals for a cable sys-
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thorities, as rational, self-interested agents, to increase monopoly power
via franchise agreements in order to create market value that they may
reallocate in a political framework. Since these fattened franchises will
be sought in public auction, the politician can expect to receive offers
for the monopoly rights equal to the discounted present value of such
rights. The bids will only partly be paid as cash payments to local
government coffers; 5 they are also paid through campaign contribu-
tions, offers of free program time and use of production facilities to
influential interest groups, advantageous equity offerings to political
supporters of key legislators, and an overinvestment in nonremunerative
cable services. 86
The politicized nature of such decisions quickly dispels any illu-
sions about concern for the general interests of consumers. Local lobby-
ing ability dominates the "'rational" selection of a monopolist, reducing
the influence of general consumer interests on selection. In an accurate
assessment of the cable franchising process, Donald Sizemore, a former
tern .... [Ilt is not unusual for cable companies to be able to orient their
proposals toward specific consultants whose evaluation systems have been
studied. Thus, what looks good on paper may well bear no relationship to
reality.
Sizemore, The New Politics of Cable Television, CAL. J., Aug. 1982, at 297, 298.
8 The outright (lump sum) auction was rendered illegal by a ruling of the Fed-
eral Communications Commission. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.31(b) (1973). This limited the
tax imposed by municipalities to 3% of franchisees' gross revenues per year, unless
special conditions are shown, in which case taxes could be raised to a maximum of 5%.
This latter cap has now been codified by Congress. See Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984, § 622(b), 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (Supp. III 1985). The mere fact that it was
deemed necessary to restrain cities from "overtaxation" is evidence of the anticonsumer
sentiment inherent in municipal cable regulation.
88 In contesting for desirable markets, cable companies approach each
franchise very much the way a politician approaches an election, mapping
a strategy, outlining the key issues, and recruiting influential supporters.
One of the most widely used tactics is wfiat is known in the industry as
the "rent a civic leader" approach-a large cable company will invite a
group of local citizens to help it form a local cable company. Local inter-
ests usually control 20 percent of the new enterprise. The large cable com-
pany keeps the rest and agrees to build thq system if the franchise is
awarded. Only one of the major cable companies, UA-Columbia Cablevi-
sion, has so far refused to take in local partners. President Robert Rose-
crans says: "We don't believe in giving away 20 percent."
In Fort Wayne, Indiana, A.T.C.'s local partners included the or-
ganizers of an educational-TV station and a group of black ministers. Cox
Cable, which is about to become a subsidiary of General Electric, allied
itself with a local cable company that already had the franchise for the
surrounding county. Cox Cable's partners apparently had more clout-it
won. Henry Harris, the former president of Cox Cable and now head of
Metrovision, a joint venture with Newhouse, thinks that "having the right
local people is 80 percent of the game."
Bernstein, Television's Expanding World, FORTUNE, July 2, 1979, at 64, 67.
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consultant to the California State Senate's government operations sub-
committee, which investigated cable franchising, writes:
The lobbying process begins with the hiring of politi-
cally savvy and influential local consultants. These people
are not chosen for their knowledge of cable television or com-
munity needs. Rather, they are experts on the local officials
and the political arena. These consultants trade upon the
special relationships they have established with the local au-
thorities in order to gain improved access and credibility for
their employers.
The next stage in lobbying is to line up support for a
company's proposal among influential community groups.
Such support is gained by tailoring parts of the franchise
proposal to benefit the goals of these groups. Thus, one com-
pany might dedicate a portion of its revenue to the mainte-
nance of a deficit-ridden art museum ...
Finally, there is the most controversial franchise-win-
ning tactic of all-rent-a-citizen. Prominent local people are
given stock in the subsidiary that will operate the franchise.
These individuals are usually part of the local political scene
and important to the continued political success of those who
will grant the franchise.
8 7
'7 Sizemore, supra note 84, at 297. The following account of the auction for one
of the major Los Angeles City franchises adds interesting detail to Sizemore's general
franchising scenario. The process to award the East San Fernando Valley franchise
began in 1978 but had not, by mid-1985, resulted in the wiring of the franchise area,
although United Cable had received a franchise in 1983. In seeking the franchise
award, six companies contributed over $300,000 directly to political campaigns and
undertook lobbying expenditures including the following:
- Assigning at least one and sometimes two or three high-powered lobby-
ists to each council member. The lobbyists include former California At-
torney General Evelle Younger and former Supervisor Yvonne Brathwaite
Burke.
- Recruiting community leaders as supporters by offering them company
stock, usually at low rates. These so-called "rent-a-citizens" could make
huge profits if their firm wins and they later sell their stock.
- Entertaining council members in posh restaurants, throwing gala re-
ceptions for the entire council and providing officials with Christmas gifts,
tickets to plays and movies, private boxes at the racetrack and other favors.
- Offering money and television equipment to influential grass-roots
groups in return for their endorsements.
Company spokesmen say that high-powered lobbying is a fact of life.
"We have to do these things, to make these contributions. . . . It's just
part of the process," said Joe Cerrell, a Group W consultant.
Getlin, Council Besieged by Cable TV Lobbyists, L.A. Times, Aug. 3, 1982, at I-1, col.
3, 1-3, col. 1. The article also quotes industry analyst Carl Pilnick as saying, "Cable
firms believe it's who you know that counts'. . . . They seek out such people only for
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It may thus be in the interests of regulators to enhance monopoly
power rather than to dissipate it, and in particular, to create lasting
monopoly power that may be difficult for future voters to retract. 8,
This aspect of franchising, which is a real fixture of the political world,
is not considered in arguments seeking to justify public regulation of
alleged natural monopoly. Most importantly, it recognizes the influence
of rational self-interest in the political realm. In contrast, the public
interest view of natural monopoly regulation assumes away incentive
and informational problems for government actors, but holds that pri-
vate parties still contend with the grubby incentives and uncertainties of
the real world. Hence, the conclusion that open competition is wasteful
and that monopoly franchising is in the consumer's interest is derived
not by analysis, but by asymmetric assumption. 89
The disadvantages and perverse political incentives arising from
franchise monopoly have led many economists who concede some or all
of the natural monopoly argument with respect to cable television to
question the advantages of regulation. Douglas Webbink summarizes
the dilemma as follows:
[E]ven if CATV [community antennae television, i.e., cable
television] is a natural monopoly, that is not sufficient evi-
dence to show that common carrier or public utility regula-
tion would be efficient . .. [I]t would be necessary to show
that consumers or society are better off if there is regulation
of entry, exit, rate of return, specific rates, expenditures, and
conditions of service, rather than if those were left
their influence, and they do this all over the nation." Id.; see also Boyarsky, Political
Hired Guns Now Working for Cable Firms, L.A. Times, Dec. 5, 1981, at I-1, col. 1
(describing how cable companies employ former political campaign staff workers to
promote cable bids through polls, parties, political contributions, and stock
distributions).
" Robert J. Michaels makes this point quite clearly. The more likely a given
monopoly right is to stay in place, the higher a price the politician can command for
awarding that monopoly right in the present period. See Michaels, Long-Term Political
Agreements and the Origins of Bureaucratic Power, in PUBLIC CHOICE IN NEW OR-
LEANS 37 (G. Tullock ed. 1978). This explanation may shed light on the reasons that
monopoly cable franchises are issued for 15 to 20 years or more, when a 2 to 4 year
construction period protection would be sufficient to eliminate any wasteful duplication
problem and irresistably establish a "rationally" selected natural monopolist (assuming
the cities' natural monopoly argument).
89 Interestingly, this methodological error mirrors the general theoretical treat-
ment of monopoly in the economics literature. Harold Demsetz notes: "The oft-asserted
inefficiency of monopoly is based on a comparison to the standard of perfect decentrali-
zation, a standard that is theoretically derivable only under the very conditions denied
by the existence of a monopoly-caused deadweight loss." H. Demsetz, Economic, Legal,
and Political Dimensions of Competition 11-20 (Sept. 1981) (discussion paper 209,
University of California, Los Angeles, Department of Economics).
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unregulated. °
Dr. Webbink also notes, "Assuming that CATV is currently a natural
monopoly, that still does not imply that there is any reason to restrict
entry,"91 suggesting that new technology is a progressive means of com-
batting monopoly.92 Webbink concludes, "[I]t might be desirable to
place a flat ban on exclusive franchises, given the small probability that
they are ever in the interest of consumers."9
Bruce Owen and Peter Greenhalgh, in a widely cited work on
cable television, are also very clear about the high costs of franchise
monopoly. They estimate economies of density equal to about 14%.""
While some champions of franchising are tempted to advance such
economies as evidence of the efficiency of franchise monopoly,95 Owen
and Greenhalgh go in quite a different direction: "Although this is
hardly negligible, it is within the range of monopoly markups that
might be expected in the absence of competition or effective regulation.
Therefore, consumers might be better off with competition, in spite of
the cost penalty from lost scale economies."196 They conclude their study
by stating:
Both the evidence and the policy considerations suggest that
policymakers should at least seriously consider the benefits of
an open entry policy [with respect to cable television
franchising]. Economies of scale and cost subadditivity, while
present, are not so substantial as to entirely rule out the pos-
sibility of effective actual or potential competition in this
industry.9"
The study's conclusion is all the more powerful when the cost of
government regulation incurred during the process of granting
franchises is factored into the equation. If an overbuild of identical sys-
90 Webbink, Should Cable TV Be Regulated As a Public Utility?, 89 PuB. UTIL.
FORT., June 22, 1972, at 32, 33-34.
91 Id. at 34.
92 See id. This farsighted view of cable predates current advances in technology,
which many local governments are attempting to keep from consumers. See infra text
accompanying notes 152-55.
9 Webbink, supra note 90, at 34.
See Owen & Greenhalgh, Competitive Considerations in Cable Television
Franchising, 4 CONTEMP. PoL'y Issuas 69, 76 (1986). This implies that two identical
overbuilt systems would experience costs about 14% higher than one monopolist serving
the same customers.
" See Nadel, supra note 67, at 541 n.1; Affidavit of Professor G. Richard Mead-
ows at 3, RVS Cablevision Corp. v. City of Brookfield, No. 83-C-1686 (E.D. Wisc.
March 11, 1985).
" Owen & Greenhalgh, supra note 94, at 76.
97 Id. at 78.
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tems, the worst-case scenario from a cost perspective, 98 were to increase
per unit costs by 14%, these costs could plausibly be more than entirely
offset by eliminating the costs of politically demanded services required
of exclusive franchise winners but of low economic value to consum-
ers.99 Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that just this sort of offset is
likely. The firm of Ernst & Whinney has found that for a typical
franchise, "[a]pproximately 22 percent of total subscriber revenues are
used to cover costs which the system would not have incurred without
the franchise requirements. When the system is mature, this will
amount to approximately $5.60 per month per subscriber."10 °
It is just this sort of anticonsumer government intervention that
leads economist G. Kent Webb to question the wisdom of franchise
monopoly. Webb believes that "[firom the perspective of cost, cable
television is a natural geographic monopoly."' 0 Significantly, Webb
does not argue that natural monopoly invariably warrants monopoly
franchising. In the very same discussion, Webb addresses the broader
question of public policy: "Neglected in this [natural monopoly] conclu-
sion are the direct and indirect costs of regulation that may be incurred
if the cable system is to operate as a monopoly."' ' In Webb's view,
whatever the industry cost function, political regulation is no panacea.
As he observes in his concluding chapter, under the now obsolete as-
sumption of local price regulation:
The case study of Philadelphia supports the premise
that when several firms participate in the competitive bid-
ding for a cable franchise, prices are proposed that can be
expected to produce approximately normal profits for the
S This maximizes the duplication penalty. Were different systems to be overbuilt,
as is more likely, enhanced consumer choice would tend to mitigate the duplication
problem.
99 If consumers valued the services highly (i.e., were willing to pay in excess of
their marginal cost of provision), cable firms would eagerly supply and profit from
them, making local governments' mandate of such services superfluous.
100 Ernst & Whinney, The Cost of Cable Television Regulatory & Franchise Re-
quirements: A Preliminary Analysis 3 (Apr. 1982) (unpublished study prepared for the
National Cable Television Association). In its analysis of the Denver franchise, the
Cable Television Information Center (CTIC) gives a 16% estimate, which differs from
the Ernst & Whinney estimate only in its far more optimistic assumption of an average
monthly revenue per subscriber of $37.50. In actual dollar terms, CTIC found costs to
be $6.00 per month per subscriber, compared to Ernst & Whinney's estimate of $5.60.
See Touche Ross & Co., supra note 74, at 41; table 2, infra p. 1397.
101 G. WEBB, THE ECONOMICS OF CABLE TELEVISION 59 (1983). With respect
to this empirical conclusion, Eli Noam comments that Webb's "brief and simple esti-
mation" yields economies of scale "so vast . . .as to be unpersuasive." Noam, supra
note 44, at 95.
1o2 G. WEBB, supra note 101, at 59.
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firm. Monopoly market power has not been eliminated,
however; it is sometimes exercised indirectly by the munici-
pality, which may require extensive investment in public fa-
cilities as one of the terms of the franchise contract. In doing
so, the municipality uses the monopoly status of the cable
system to extract revenue from households in the franchise
area ...
Ironically, although much of the public concern regard-
ing the abuse of monopoly market power has been directed
at the private firm, it is often the municipalities, charged
with regulating the industry, that have wielded the market
power. 03
C. Is Cable Television a Natural Monopoly?
Municipalities argue that because one cable firm can serve a given
area more cheaply than two or more, cable television distribution is a
natural monopoly. Accounting evidence from industry experts is com-
monly introduced to show that direct competition is either impossible,
wasteful, or both.
This argument is suspect on at least three counts. First, it clearly
confuses economies of scale with economies of density.'" That is, while
hypothetical cost studies10 5 purport to show that two firms covering all
of a city cannot operate as cheaply as one, such studies do not address
the traditional economies of scale question. For instance, Touche Ross
case studies in Maple Heights, Ohio; Denver, Colorado; and Jefferson
City, Missouri "found that average costs would be substantially lower
if one operator served the market than if two operators competed in an
overbuild." 1°0 Even if two overbuilt firms are more expensive than one,
the errant conclusion is that one large firm is less costly on a per unit
basis than two (or n) firms each serving half (or 1/n) of the geographic
market. Conceding that a cost advantage arises from spreading firms
out spatially, such studies do not make a case for one large firm serving
an entire franchise region.
The advantages to consumers of allowing several smaller firms to
103 Id. at 179-80.
I" Strictly speaking, economies of density are a distinct type of economies of scale.
Density economies are scale economies where volume is measured on a per mile or per
number of homes passed basis rather than on an absolute size standard.
10" These studies do not use actual figures based on data from operating systems
but projections of the cable companies competing for a franchise.
10I Declaration of Jay C. Smith 29, at 14, Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of
Sacramento, No. CIV S-83-1034 MLS (E.D. Cal. May 9, 1985).
[Vol. 134:1335
PRIVATE MONOPOLY AND CABLE TELEVISION
serve different parts of a city are apparent.10 7 The main point, how-
ever, is that density economies may coexist with diseconomies of scale.
Monopoly franchises may well create wasteful monopoly conditions by
extending franchise regions beyond efficient parameters. In an open en-
try environment, a single firm that overexpanded would be defeated by
smaller, more efficient rivals. At bottom, economies of scale refer to
system size, not density.
To claim that any given city or county can be run as one system
more cheaply than as two or more nonoverlapping systems does require
an economies of scale argument, but the economic analyses offer little
support for such an argument. Eli Noam, in his study of 4800 cable
systems, finds significant economies of scope, meaning that integrating
cable provision and cable programming seems to be efficient, but
"fairly small returns to scale are observed for the separate output mea-
sure 'Homes Passed,' which is largely a transmission definition of out-
put."10 Similarly, Owen and Greenhalgh conclude that "cable service
prices do not in fact vary substantially with city size."109 Even a
profranchising study concluded from a survey of cable systems that
"[n]o relationship has been reported between size of franchise area and
various basic or additional services specified,"110 and that "[p]roposed
subscriber rates have not been related to franchise areas." '
Second, the accounting methodology of typical cost studies encour-
ages recommendations of one firm per region by assuming high fixed
costs and constant variable costs. This methodology creates by definition
107 Fundamentally, the availability of several suppliers allows consumers to select
successful competitors subjectively in an open market, rather than forcing them to rely
on the political selection process, and preserves the option of direct rivalry as a con-
straint on monopolistic behavior. Alfred E. Kahn and Irwin M. Stelzer note:
If we were to encourage cable companies to operate, if not one on top
of the other, then at least in adjacent territories, this would create the
possibility that the performance of the one could always be held up as a
model for the performance of the other; or that dissatisfied patrons of the
one might, at least at the margin of their respective territories, invite the
other in to take over the service. Competition even at the fringes of each
territory could have a powerful demonstration and stimulative effect for
the entire area.
A. Kahn & I. Stelzer, Communications Regulatory Reform in New York State: A Re-
port Prepared at the Request of Gov. Hugh L. Carey 5 (Mar. 25, 1981) (unpublished
study prepared by the National Economic Research Associates, Inc.) (footnote omitted).
10B Noam, supra note 44, at 113.
09 Owen & Greenhalgh, supra note 94, at 77.
110 Booz Allen, supra note 58, at 111-8.
"I Id. This may help to explain why large city cable systems are remarkably
unprofitable. According to cable securities analyst Anthony Hoffman of A.G. Becker,
"The city is a hostile cable environment that is filled with inefficiencies not found in
rural areas or small towns." Cooney, Cable TV's Costly Trip to the Big Cities, FoR-
TUNE, April 18, 1983, at 82.
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a situation of declining average cost, yet its constant variable cost pre-
mise is questionable. For instance, management appears to become
more expensive on a per unit basis as output expands. As firms become
larger they require more layers of supervision and control, the cost of
which offsets in part, wholly, or more than wholly, declining per unit
costs realized from spreading a fixed plant investment over an increas-
ing number of subscribers. In practice, large cities such as Los Angeles
and Philadelphia 1 2 routinely'subdivide their exclusive cable franchises
into several nonoverlapping regions."1
In addition, because the headend investment is not a fixed cost in
servicing a large metropolitan area, the diseconomy of scale problem
associated with managing bigger and more complex systems becomes all
the more important.
The frequent amplification required to maintain the
strength of signals traveling through coaxial cable limits the
extent to which the cost of the headend can be shared. Ex-
cessive amplification reduces signal quality to below accept-
able levels. As a result, the largest market that can be ade-
quately served by a single headend is about six miles in
radius.
11 4
Hence, the inevitable limitations on technical economies of scale,
combined with managerial diseconomies of scale, may help to explain
some striking empirical inconsistencies with the natural monopoly ar-
gument. For instance, if average cost declines significantly as homes
passed or number of subscribers increases, then it appears reasonable to
predict that the thirty largest cable systems in the United States, with
an average of 95,913 subscribers each, ought to offer equivalent services
at lower prices than the thirty-one smallest systems, which average just
186 subscribers. 15 Yet 1982 data from Paul Kagan and Associates in-
11" As of June 1981, the city of Los Angeles had issued eight franchises and was
planning to issue at least four more. None of these licenses involved overlapping juris-
dictions. Five franchises each included 150,000 or more homes. City of Los Angeles
Department of Transportation, Cable Television Statistics (June 1981) (unpublished
study). In 1979, Philadelphia was divided into four cable franchise regions despite hav-
ing but 400,000 homes citywide. See Booz Allen, supra note 58, at exhibit 1.
11I The increasing per unit cost of managerial coordination is exceptionally diffi-
cult to discern from proposals put forth by managers who are in the process of attempt-
ing to convince public officials of their ability to run a franchise-wide monopoly
efficiently.
114 See G. WB, supra note 101, at 153.
a Data is drawn from PAUL KAGAN AND ASsOcIATES, THE KAGAN CENSUS OF
CABLE AND PAY TV (Dec. 31, 1982), as analyzed in T. Hazlett, supra note 28, at
351-53. The 30 largest systems are compared with the 31 smallest systems because
there was a tie for 30th smallest.
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dicates that the average price charged by the smaller systems for basic
cable is 5% below, and for premium channels is 9% below, the average
price charged by the larger systems.116 By contrast, it is difficult to im-
agine an electrical generation facility serving only 200 customers oper-
ating at a lower unit cost or charging lower prices than a facility serv-
ing 100,000 users. If economies of scale exist in the cable television
industry, such economies are certainly so modest as to be far less in
evidence than in traditional natural monopoly industries, and thus can
be easily overcome by other factors. The existence of a simple, linear,
and inverse relationship between per unit costs and output, suggested
by the economies of scale argument, is not supported empirically.
In cable television, as in most industries, factors that lower per
unit costs as scale increases are in tension with other factors that raise
per unit costs. The interplay of these offsetting effects is highly compli-
cated and depends on variables such as geography, capital market con-
ditions, timing, managerial expertise, labor costs, consumer preferences,
technology, and marketing costs. Without an objective standard by
which to predict the most efficient level of production, and given the
high level of complexity involved, the political entities awarding cable
franchises have virtually no mechanism by which to discern the most
efficient scale. For this reason, economists are presumptively sympa-
thetic to market survivorship as an efficient selector of the optimal size
of firms as opposed to arbitrarily imposed size constraints. As Donald
McCloskey explains:
A firm that is "fit" in the size it has chosen will survive by
being profitable. Unfit species will vanish. If sizes of firms in
the retail women's clothing trade cluster around one size (of
firm-or, for that matter, of dress), we seek reasons for the
apparent optimality of the size. We use the results of selec-
tion to guide what would otherwise be an impossibly difficult
inquiry into the cost curves of firms. If there were no pre-
sumption that the sizes and other characteristics of firms that
survive are in fact the least cost characteristics, economic
studies would be as crippled as would be ecological studies
that could make no presumption that the cowardice of wolves
in the hunt or the falling of leaves in autumn are in fact
valuable for the survival of wolves or of broadleaf plants.11
These price differentials are statistically significant at the 95% level. See T.
Hazlett, supra note 28, at 352.
11 D. MCCLOSKEY, THE APPLIED THEORY OF PRICE 265 (1982) (footnotes
omitted).
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Third, the assumption that identical outputs are produced by hy-
pothetically identical rivals in a competitive scenario intrinsically ren-
ders the outcome of the competition, whether sustainable or not, mean-
ingless. A scenario in which two firms simultaneously offer consumers
identical products at identical costs does not allow the advantages of
competitive enterprise to be realized. The serious error in making this
assumption is demonstrated by the realization that virtually all com-
mercial and industrial firms in the economy exhibit the declining per
unit cost attribute supposedly exhibited by cable television companies.
As Martin L. Weitzman writes:
For a variety of reasons, including dynamic learning ef-
fects, modern mass-production methods tend to be character-
ized by economies of scale or average costs that decline as
output is expanded over the long run. In most industries the
cost per unit of output is less for a high-volume producer
than for a low-volume producer. From automobiles to books
to computers-and on through the product alphabet-every
business person knows that unit costs typically go down with
the size of the production run. 18
Yet, both in this country and abroad, vigorous rivalry exists even
in such declining-cost industries. There is competition because different
firms offer consumers different packages:
Counteracting this tendency toward bigness is the fact that
not all people want exactly the same thing . . . . You may
like the peppiness of a Ford Mustang while I want the ser-
vice reliability of a Toyota Corolla. A Maytag washing ma-
chine is initially more expensive to buy than a Whirlpool,
but it saves on future energy and maintenance costs. The
IBM computer is better for business uses, but the Digital is
superior for scientific work. Such examples can be replicated
almost indefinitely.
.. . The predisposition for declining costs to cause
high-volume production is thus offset by constrained buyer
interest.' 19
The argument that a given supplier can produce additional ser-
vices more cheaply than an entering competitor may also be offered to
bolster the natural monopoly analysis. Such cost advantages are gener-
118 M. WErrZMAN, THE SHARE ECONOMY: CONQUERING STAGFLATION 11
(1984).
119 Id. at 11-12.
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ally labeled economies of scope and are to some degree extant in com-
mercial and manufacturing businesses everywhere. It is theoretically
cheaper for an established firm to serve specialized preferences than for
an entrant to incur all the start-up costs already paid by the established
firm. It is certainly much cheaper, for instance, for Ford Motor Com-
pany, which has already sunk billions of dollars in a massive nation-
wide marketing organization consisting of hundreds of dealerships,
wholesalers, and advertisers, to market the Honda Civic, than it would
be for a small motorcycle manufacturer with virtually none of Ford's
sunk cost advantages, to do the same. Similarly, how do both the New
York Daily News and New York Post stay in business head-to-head,
when the fixed costs of reporters, printing presses, and advertising sales
personnel so dwarf the variable cost of one more section or column? 1 0
Differences among firms are reflected in many tangible and intangible
attributes, including reliability, timing, personnel practices, packaging,
marketing skill, financial expertise, and servicing. Countless product
parameters form a bewildering matrix of firm qualities, differentiating
competitors to consumers even where rivals appear indistinguishable to
the policy analyst or government regulator.
In short, by focusing exclusively on economies of scale and assum-
ing away all differences between products and among consumer tastes,
one loses altogether the very rationale for competitive enterprise. If
each firm offers the same output, and each industry exhibits some de-
creasing unit costs, the obvious course is to have governments establish
"efficient" state monopolies over all industries. Significantly, competi-
tion's greatest advantage lies in the efficient selection process it offers in
instances where firms are many, their products diverse, entrepreneurial
talents unpredictable, and consumer preferences difficult to discern."'
12 The current intense newspaper rivalry between the Detroit News and the De-
troit Free Press, for example, shows the tension between scale economies, which tilt the
market to monopoly, and heterogeneous consumer preferences, which invite multiple
entry. See Vise, Detroit Newspaper Rivalry May End Soon, Wash. Post, Aug. 25,
1985, at Fl, col. 3.
121 Sowell describes the information-seeking propensities of market competition as
a subtle process:
Economic knowledge need not be articulated to the consumer, but is con-
veyed-summarized-in the prices and qualities of goods. The consumer
may have no idea at all-or even a wrong idea-as to why one product
costs less and serves his purposes better; all he needs is that end-result
itself. Someone must of course have the specific knowledge of how to
achieve that result. What is crucial to economic competition is that better
and more accurate knowledge on the part of the producer is a decisive
competitive advantage, regardless of whether the consumer shares any
part of that knowledge. In political competition, accurate knowledge has
no such decisive competitive advantage, because what is being sold is not
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It should be noted carefully that all competition is wasteful duplication
when viewed from the comfortable confines of the homogeneity as-
sumption underlying the economies of scale argument.
The natural monopoly defense of the municipal cable television
franchising industry rests its empirical case on the widespread existence
of monopoly in the industry.1 22 This case is questionable; the existence
of monopoly, whether in franchised jurisdictions or in open entry com-
munities, is not by itself evidence contradicting the consumer advan-
tages of free competition.
First, the creation of monopolies by governments may reflect a po-
litical, rather than an economic, efficiency. Hence, it may be that a
legal, not a market, entry barrier promotes one-seller markets. Judge
Posner clearly identifies government as the source of cable monopoly:
As the cable television business now operates, subscribers are
rarely if ever given a choice between cable companies; only
one cable company solicits their patronage. The immediate
cause of this, however, is not any inherent characteristic of
cable television but the fact that a cable company must ob-
tain a municipal franchise in order to be permitted to serve
any part of the community. Whether it is because they as-
sume that the cable television business is a natural monop-
oly, and they desire to limit the (surely minor) inconvenience
to the public of having several companies using public rights
of way to string or lay cable, or alternatively, because they
seek a share of monopoly profits in the form of franchise
fees, municipalities do not grant more than one cable
franchise in any area within their jurisdiction.123
Further, Posner discusses franchising of cable television companies as-
suming the presence of natural monopoly cost conditions and concludes:
[Tlhere is a danger that the franchising authority will be
an end-result but a plausible belief about a complex process.
T. SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 38 (1980)."' Speaking for the U.S. Conference of Mayors in federal hearings, Thomas
Taylor, mayor of Westland, Michigan, employed the natural monopoly argument to
ask, "If cities cannot retain the right to regulate rates ...who will protect the con-
sumer of this monopolistic service from price gouging?" Crock, The Fight to Control
Cable TV Franchises, Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 1981, at 30, cols. 4, 5. Similarly, National
League of Cities' attorney Nicolas Miller has noted of cable systems: "They are mo-
nopolies created not by the cities, but by the marketplace. . . .The issue is whether
they'll be regulated or unregulated monopolies." Cohen, Cable-Television Firms and
Cities Haggle Over Franchises That Trail Expectations, Wall St. J., Dec. 28, 1983, at
34, cols. 1, 3.
1'3 Posner, supra note 66, at 111.
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tempted to offer applicants not merely the right to wire
homes in its jurisdiction but the exclusive right to do so. By
adding a legal monopoly to the franchisee's natural monop-
oly, the franchising authority may be able to extract a larger
sum from the franchisee, but at considerable social cost; for
the grant of long-term exclusive franchises to cable compa-
nies may retard the process by which changes in technology
can, over time, erode a natural monopoly.
1 24
Posner implies that at least some regulation occurs for political
profit rather than for consumer welfare. Monopolistic regulatory ar-
rangements have historically proven more lucrative to the regulatees
and regulators than to the public. William K. Jones is quite explicit
with respect to the benefits of such arrangements:
The danger is that regulatory restrictions upon entry will be
employed to bar entry into markets that lack natural-monop-
oly characteristics and in which competition would be benefi-
cial. (Restrictions upon entry into trucking and air transpor-
tation are examples of misplaced entry controls; these
markets do not exhibit natural-monopoly characteristics, and
the regulatory programs in these industries lack any other
discernible rational foundation.)
1 2 5
To evaluate monopoly franchises accurately, one must compare the
verifiable benefits accruing to consumers of franchise monopolies with
the benefits offered by firms operating in an open entry market in
which actual and potential competitors are free to regulate the behavior
of cable television suppliers. In a sample of twelve open entry systems,
1982 prices for basic and premium services did not differ significantly
from national averages although these open entry systems consisted
124 Id. at 113.
125 Jones, Deregulation and Regulatory Reform in Natural-Monopoly Markets,
in DEREGULATING AMERICAN INDUSTRY 39, 48 (D. Martin & W. Schwartz eds.
1977). Note that the airline industry is no longer believed to present a natural monop-
oly problem although it exhibits pronounced scale of economies and was alleged to be a
natural monopoly by regulators for decades.
Just as airline deregulation is viewed as benefiting consumers, see supra note 39,
so has deregulation in the trucking industry brought benefits to shippers. See, e.g.,
Machalaba, Shippers' Market: More Companies Push Freight Haulers to Get Better
Rates, Service, Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1985, at 1, col. 6 (While deregulation has resulted
in failure of some trucking companies and in loss of some jobs, shippers have cut more
than $25 billion from freight costs, an estimated $10 billion of which is reflected in
lower prices for consumers, who now receive better on-time service and the advantages
of specialized new equipment.).
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largely of low density communities.12 Dale City, Virginia, for exam-
ple, charged only $5.50 monthly for basic cable, a rate just $.05 above
the lowest in the state.127 This system, with 7000 subscribers, had a
penetration ratio (homes connected divided by homes passed) of 93.3%,
the sixth highest in Virginia.1 28 This ratio is significant in that a mo-
nopoly problem is thought to exist when a firm is able to restrict output
from the competitive level, and thereby raise its prices. In signing up
nearly nineteen of every twenty homes in its service area, the Dale City
"unregulated monopolist" does not appear to be engaging in a great
deal of monopolistic output restriction. 29
In such open entry communities, where cable suppliers are re-
quired only to pay general business license fees and satisfy regulations
governing private use of public rights of way, entry occurs easily but
generally does not result in overbuilt systems. An absence of overbuild-
ing does not render competition useless (or wasteful) because the legally
credible threat of entry may effectively constrain the incumbent monop-
olist's behavior. Indeed, the most efficient competition would be that
which gives resource owners the incentive to act in the consumers' in-
terests, without, however, requiring the expenditure of real resources.
Such competition, however, depends on an absence of legal barriers, so
that firms are free to enter should the incumbent's behavior become
sufficiently careless as to warrant direct competition. The dearth of
overbuild situations in jurisdictions allowing open entry may be evi-
dence of open entry's efficiency in constraining prices to competitive
levels rather than proof of competition's impotence.1 30
128 See Hazlett, Competition vs. Franchise Monopoly in Cable Television, 4 CoN-
TEMP. PoL'Y IssuEs 80, 83-85 (1986).
127 See id. at 84.
128 See id.
129 Other examples of open entry jurisdictions are unincorporated Pima County,
Arizona; San Diego County, California; and Prince William County, Virginia. See id.
at 83-85.
180 Because multiple cable entrants are legally barred in localities awarding exclu-
sive franchises, the proportion of overbuilds is exceedingly difficult to discern in that no
comprehensive listing of free entry jurisdictions is available. While nearly 100 multiple
franchise awards have been identified historically, see table 1, infra p.1374, several
hundred unfranchised systems may today be in existence nationally. For instance, a
recent Pennsylvania cable survey found that 32 systems in the state operated without
official franchise agreements. These systems represented 15.9% of the systems surveyed
for which a definite franchise or no-franchise status could be determined. See D. Allen
& D. Kennedy, Municipal Regulation of Cable Television in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania 3-11 (Dec. 1982) (unpublished paper, Pennsylvania State University: In-
stitute of Public Administration). A casual survey of the evidence reveals that while
overbuilding rarely occurs in open entry jurisdictions, it is fairly common in multiple
franchise areas. See table 1, infra p. 1374. It may well be that the continued threat of
potential entry is a more efficient regulator than multiple franchising.
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Direct competition can and does occur. Established systems in
Chapman, Kansas; Niceville, Florida; and Colorado Springs, Colorado
have very recently been challenged by direct competitive entry, al-
though Niceville's entrant was a municipally owned cable firms. In-
deed, inviting competition may now be gaining favor as a regulatory
device among communities: "[T]here are situations in which city offi-
cials, frustrated with the incumbent operator, will be attracted to over-
builds as a quick and easy means to increase the pressure to improve
service." ' 2 Direct competition between overlapping franchises has also
been credited with increasing the construction rate as competitors
pushed to wire homes before rivals in Phoenix, Arizona, and with low-
ering prices and improving service in an ongoing twenty-year overbuild
in Allentown, Pennsylvania."'3
For all the effort spent by cities, their consultants, and franchise
monopolists to dispel the notion that direct competition is a viable mar-
ket possibility, their own evidence suggests the "impossible." Because
overbuilds are not legally feasible in the monopoly franchise jurisdic-
tions that comprise the vast majority of cable distribution systems,
13
the opportunities for multiple entry and overbuilding are severely lim-
ited. Yet using data from a promonopoly study commissioned by the
city of Monroe, Georgia, and introduced as an exhibit in other
franchise litigation, we can discern that of ninety-three multiple cable
131 See Moozakis, Range Wars, CABLE TELEvISION Bus., Sept. 15, 1985, at 21,
21-22.
132 Id. at 23.
233 See Promised Land?, CABLE TELEWvSION Bus., Sept. 15, 1985 at 22-23.
Other analysts have noted, "In many cases, municipalities have elected to award multi-
ple competitive cable franchises in the belief that competition would accelerate satura-
tion (homes passed as a percentage of total homes in the franchise area), and this has
often been the result. . . .A wiring race between competitors in Paramus, New Jersey
(7,700 households) resulted in construction of cable facilities [in] over 95 percent of the
city in only 20 months . . . ." Pearce, Peterson & Fredrickson, Competitive Cable
Franchising: Analysis of Economic Theory and Empirical Data 15 (1982) (unpub-
lished study for the city of Monroe, Ga.) [hereinafter Pearce]. "In years past, a handful
of municipalities with undeveloped systems permitted overbuilding to stimulate con-
struction speed and to generate municipal franchise fees. . . . Intense wiring races cul-
minating in significant overbuilding, caused saturation levels in Allentown, Bryan, Sal-
isbury, and Warrensburg to approach 100 percent." Booz Allen, supra note 58, at IV-
17 (emphasis and capitalization omitted).
14 Even in the pro forma arrangement under which a municipal government is-
sues a "nonexclusive" franchise, it customarily issues only one such franchise. Although
nominally nonexclusive, it is a de facto exclusive franchise. Even if it were theoretically
possible to obtain a duplicative franchise, the legal costs involved would form a signifi-
cant barrier to entry, the size of which may be discerned from the considerable legal
fees cities are themselves willing to incur to fight for their right to issue sole nonexclu-
sive franchises. Even overlapping franchise awards may introduce a monopoly problem
by facilitating tacit collusion between franchisees and deterring more efficient firms
from entering.
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systems franchised by local governments by mid-1982, fifty-one exhib-
ited varying degrees of direct competition."3 5 Moreover, at least thirteen
additional localities entertained such competition for some period, and
twenty-two of the most recently franchised areas had not yet been
wired.1"6 Hence, it appears safe to say that, where overbuilds are per-
mitted by local authorities, they are an important source of actual as
well as potential competitive pressure.83
Table 1
Multiple Entry Continuing
Franchise Has Overbuilds Consolidated
Time Period Awards Occurred (as of 1982) Overbuilds
Pre-1978 24 24 4 13
1978-1982 69 47 22-47a  N/A
TOTAL 93 71 26-51 13
Source: Pearce, Peterson & Fredrickson, Competitive Cable Franchising: Analysis of Economic
Theory and Empirical Data 12-14 (1982) (unpublished study for the city of Monroe,
Ga.).
a"Twenty-two of these are extensive and continuing overbuilds. Twenty-five are partial overbuilds
or overlapping franchises under construction . . . ." Id. at 12.
Of further importance is this study's conclusion that "[t]he marked
increase [1978-82] in the number of multiple franchises now available
can be traced to changes in the cable TV marketplace and the range of
services now available."1 8 The increase in available services provides
another way of introducing the firm heterogeneity objection to the pro
forma natural monopoly analysis, since the objection strengthens as
product differentiation increases.' In the past, large cable suppliers,
or multiple systems operators (MSOs), were reluctant to overbuild
"when more attractive alternatives [were] available," such as tapping
virgin markets on an uncabled continent' °40 "Now such alternatives are
increasingly scarce."' 4 ' Moreover:
In recent years, growth in the availability and accep-
135 See table 1, infra p. 1374.
116 See id.
"7 As table 1 indicates, overbuilds occurred in between 37% (26/71) and 90%
(64/71) of the cabled jurisdictions in the Pearce study that issued multiple overlapping
franchises. See id.
158 Pearce, supra note 133, at 14.
'39 It is also worth noting that, as pay services come to form an increasing propor-
tion of the cable package, the fixed cost component of plant investment fades in relative
importance.
140 Pearce, supra note 133, at 14.
141 Id.
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tance of pay TV has increased internal cash flow and en-
hanced operators' ability to secure the external financing
necessary to support the development of overbuilt franchises.
The diversity of programming available has strained the ca-
pacity of some older systems to deliver all the services that
their subscribers would like to receive. For these reasons
and, in some cases, because of deteriorating service quality
from existing franchisees, many more municipalities than
before are inviting bids from multiple franchises, and more
well-financed operators are responding.
1 42
The implication that "older systems" are disadvantaged by techno-
logical advance is itself an attack on the economies of scale argument
for monopoly franchises. If an incumbent supplier enjoys significant
cost advantages over all outside competitors, and all firms are assumed
to be identical in their management expertise, production efficiencies,
and proconsumer attitudes, the incumbent will easily be able to
purchase all the new products, capacity, or technology needed in order
to preclude effective competition. The empirical fact that some old sys-
tems were pressured, rivaled, and even defeated in the cable market-
place is direct evidence, on the one hand, of the inapplicability of the
natural monopoly assumptions, and, on the other hand, of the progres-
sive attributes of open competition in forcing proconsumer innovation.
D. Natural Monopoly Versus Implicit Competition
Overbuilds often spark a period of intense competition ending in a
consolidation. This result, however, does not negate the importance of
competition through overbuilding, which performs at least two critical
proconsumer functions. First, consumers benefit as better services and
lower prices are offered in exchange for their patronage. Rivalry gives
firms strong incentives to make favorable offers and allows a discovery
period that reliably rewards behavior pleasing to consumers with en-
hanced market share. The rivalry stage may be long-lived. For exam-
ple, two Bryan and College Station, Texas, cable firms competed di-
rectly from 1971 until 1984, when they were purchased and
consolidated by a third firm.'" Moreover, while the competitors fea-
tured twenty-seven and thirty-five channel systems,1 44 their basic rates
were the lowest in the state as of 1982, each charging only $4.00
242 Id.
11 See Touche Ross & Co., supra note 74, at 25.
1" See id.
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monthly despite a Texas average of $8.50.145 Furthermore, because
proponents of monopoly licensing claim that mergers of cable systems
are smoothly achieved and "the problems associated with overbuilding
diminish rapidly,"14 competition appears to create large proconsumer
returns at very modest risk.
Second, should competition through overbuilding indeed prove un-
economic in some instances, its mere possibility serves to regulate mo-
nopolists in all jurisdictions that fail to erect protectionist franchise bar-
riers. The argument that inviting entry is an expensive proposition has
two dimensions: the new cable entrant will surely think twice about
sinking new capital, but an established incumbent will also think twice
about giving potential competitors cause to raid its market. In a techno-
logically progressive industry such as cable television, an operating mo-
nopolist may well be nervous about more modern suppliers, as the
state-of-the-art is superseded every five years or so. If the unnecessary
competition argument is grounded empirically in the unprofitability of
duopoly, the incumbent becomes doubly nervous about the prospect of
competitive entry. While a large fixed investment might, once under-
taken, lead a cable operator to feel immune to competitive pressures,
the resulting temptation to raise prices will be offset by a sobering real-
ization among the sophisticated: a large, fixed investment gives the
careless incumbent more to lose. While municipalities emphasize the
costs of overbuilding, they fail to perceive that such costs make estab-
lished firms very dedicated to the preservation of their financially viable
market by not inviting entry. They are thus constrained by their non-
salvageable investment, which is tantamount to a very large perform-
ance bond, forfeitable upon prices high enough or quality poor enough
to invite successful competition. Under such conditions a monopolist
might very well prefer the political constraints of franchise monopoly to
the economic constraints of potential competition.14" 7 The common in-
terests of regulator and regulatee may be inconsistent, however, with
the interests of the consumer of cable television services.
145 See PAUL KAGAN AND ASSOCIATES, THE KAGAN CENSUS OF CABLE AND
PAY TV, Dec. 31, 1982, at 104, 113.
148 Pearce, supra note 133, at 26.
147 This may well explain why cable firms have been reluctant to oppose monop-
oly franchising: it is not at all clear that the benefits of constitutional protection (includ-
ing freedom from locally imposed costs and franchise fees, for instance) outweigh the
potential damage of increased competition. "The [National Cable Television Associa-
tion] officially support[ed the cable firm plaintiff in Preferred Communications] but
rank-and-file cabledom [was] ambivalent. 'There's no clear-cut consensus that the in-
dustry would benefit from a full-fledged challenge to the franchising process,' says the
association's general counsel . . . ." Drummond, The Farrow Factor, 5 CHANNELS
OF COMM., June 1986, at 47, 47.
[Vol. 134:1335
PRIVATE MONOPOLY AND CABLE TELEVISION
The claim that market competition is an inadequate regulator of
firm behavior in the cable industry has serious and presumably observ-
able consequences. For this natural monopoly claim to be taken seri-
ously, the threat of competitive entry must not be credible. Indeed, this
constitutes the natural monopoly problem: incumbents may exploit
their market position without fear of widespread consumer substitu-
tions that would eliminate the monopoly profit. In identifying a natural
monopoly problem, then, any particular market should be analyzed in
terms of the ability of actual and potential competition to discipline
market incumbents. For instance, the mere observation that cable tele-
vision firms are most often seen to be spatially dispersed is not necessa-
rily evidence of a natural monopoly.
In the cable television industry, much evidence reveals that compe-
tition is taken very seriously in its potential form. Municipal franchises
are often granted for a fifteen to twenty year period. If a cable system
were a natural monopoly, it would need only a head start to establish
an overwhelming cost advantage over all potential rivals, and the ma-
jority of the franchise's span would be superfluous. At the very most, a
firm need only receive exclusive franchise protection during the con-
struction phase of its system,148 which generally stretches from two to
four years. Instead of simply giving cable franchises short-term, head
start protection, however, cities routinely grant long-term, nominally
nonexclusive franchises, and thereafter refuse to issue competing
franchises. In fact, municipal governments are much more likely to liti-
gate against those competitors attempting to enter the cable market
than they are to drop entry barriers.
The market competition between community antennae television
(CATV) and satellite master antennae television (SMATV) reveals the
attitude of many local governments towards competition. CATV is the
traditional cable medium and has been challenged in recent years by
SMATV1 49 While SMATV systems originated as pay satellite channel
hook-ups attached to apartment master antennae, the more modern sys-
tems can bring in over 100 channels and, by rewiring, can bring in any
or all of CATV's video product. The remaining real difference between
the technologies is that SMATV is a system located exclusively on pri-
vate property, utilizing no public rights of way, utility poles, or under-
146 Even this protection is a denial that the system in question is a natural monop-
oly with respect to the franchised area, in which, under standard textbook assumptions
of natural monopoly, an existing supplier may expand more cheaply than any new-
comer. Hence, a "head start" is sufficient for market domination, as entry by additional
firms would be implausible.
14I See infra notes 191-99 and accompanying text.
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ground conduits. Hence, it is commonly called "private cable."
According to industry calculations, this technology is directly com-
petitive with CATV in high density areas where consumers such as
apartment dwellers are found in groups of as few as fifty.150 An Indi-
anapolis supplier, for example, is competing directly with a CATV sys-
tem in a 220 unit apartment building "and apparently winning.'
51
Rather than being welcomed into the cable business by local authorities
concerned with CATV's natural monopoly, however, SMATV opera-
tors have been obliged to "repel attempts by cities to regulate them.' 52
Municipal governments have vigorously litigated against private cable
firms, including the successful Indianapolis SMATV firm, 5 ' to pro-
hibit them from entering markets.'" The comment of a large franchise
cable operator, who believes more such litigation is needed, expresses
the view of established CATV franchisees:
When the city has held our feet to the fire and is taking 5%
[franchise tax] off the top and causing you to build a lot of
non-productive assets, it infuriates you to see them not take
action against someone who comes in and cuts into your bus-
iness. . . . I think a lot of cities realize this person is also
cutting into their business to the extent that the city takes
revenue from the cable operator.
155
This suggests that the cable franchise is understood in the industry
as a grant of monopoly position in exchange for payments of taxes and
facilities. That cities will attempt to restrict competition even where
they receive an equal franchise fee percentage from the entrant, how-
1"0 See SMATV: The Medium That's Making Cable Nervous, BROADCASTING,
June 21, 1982, at 33, 34 [hereinafter SMATV]. Jane Henry reports that by utilizing
airwave links with microwave and satellite transmitters, "by the early 1990s ad-
dressable SMATV systems will serve apartments and condominiums with as few as 25
units each," which should enable SMATV to "attract between 2 and 3 million sub-
scribers by 1992." Henry, The Economics of Pay-TV Media, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPE-
TITION 19, 55 (E. Noam ed. 1985).
151 SMATV supra note 150, at 46. The CATV firm's penetration dropped from
80% to 20% when the private cable system overbuilt the CATV system, as the latter
gained a 50% pay penetration. (No explanation is given for the vanished 10%). See id.
152 Id. at 34.
153 See Omega Satellite, 694 F.2d 119, 125-26 (7th Cir. 1982).
14 Other localities have attacked competition from private cable operators. See
Hazlett, supra note 126, at 87-90 (discussing SMATV cases involving Indianapolis;
Mankato, Minn.; Dallas; East Orange, N.J.; and Chicago); SMATV, supra note 150,
at 46 (discussing disputes involving Meridian Township, Michigan; Dallas; Chicago;
and New York).
'15 SMATV, supra note 150, at 46 (comments of Trygve Myhren, chairman and
chief executive officer of American Television and Communications Corp., a nationally
integrated cable system operator).
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ever, is evident from the case of TM Cablevision v. Daon.1 56 In this
1981 decision, a California court held that a real estate developer had
the right to contract with a nonfranchised CATV supplier. While the
California Constitution did not authorize exclusive franchises for cable
television, the Vista city government had previously refused to license
any operator save its chosen monopolist. The state court directed that a
city cable franchise be issued to the new applicant, which had agreed to
pay a city franchise fee equal to that imposed upon the incumbent. The
monopolistic intent of city government thus appears to go through and
beyond the capture of franchise fees.
157
Conversely, some local governments, instead of erecting barriers to
competitive entry, elect to open an incumbent's franchise to competi-
tion. According to the natural monopoly argument, such open competi-
tion will prove an impotent regulator of the incumbent's behavior. Ex-
periences in a number of actual cable markets refute this view. In
Presque Isle, Maine, for example, an established cable system was pro-
viding only twelve channels of service in the early 1980's.158 Dissatis-
fied with this limited service, the city council decided to issue a compet-
ing cable franchise. Soon thereafter, the incumbent announced plans to
upgrade to a fifty-four channel capacity complete with the traditional
complement of satellite services. In the end, the second franchise de-
cided not to enter the market against the upgraded incumbent. None-
theless, the competitive pressure, activated only when the exclusive
franchise arrangement was rendered obsolete, observably enhanced con-
sumer welfare.
The Presque Isle experience is not unique. In late 1982, Tele-
Communications, which operated the sole franchised cable system in
Kearney, Nebraska, had wired but 70% of the city, although the system
had been established in 1967.59 The company, providing just twelve
channels of service, proposed a rate increase, subject to city approval,
for its basic service package from $8.50 to $11.50 per month. When the
city responded, however, by issuing a second franchise to Kearney
Cablevision, Tele-Communications added basic and premium channels,
15 TM Cablevision v. Daon, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2576 (Cal. Super. Ct., San
Diego County 1981).
'17 See Hazlett, Private Contracting vs. Public Regulation as a Solution to the
Natural Monopoly Problem, in UNNATUMAL MONOPOLIEs 71, 93-100 (R. Poole ed.
1985).
158 This discussion of the Presque Isle, Maine, situation is based on a June 5,
1984 telephone conversation with Earle Johnston, system manager of Group W Cable
of Presque Isle.
159 All information on the Kearney, Nebraska example is drawn from Declaration
of John M. Mansell at 13, Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. United States,
Civil Action 83-3722 (D.D.C. 1983).
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expanded its cable plant by several miles, and dropped its request for a
rate increase. Despite this action, Kearney entered the market and
wired 80% of the city by mid-1983. In short order, the competition had
brought consumers a choice between two firms, each offering more
channels of basic programming than originally provided by the sole
franchise, in addition to pay TV satellite channels and services.
Evidence also indicates that cable consumers enjoy enhanced ser-
vices when direct competitors serve a market. A key variable is penetra-
tion: where higher penetration is realized, consumers have indicated by
their patronage that the price/service package has improved. Hence, it
is significant that when an existing cable operator in Bryan, Texas,
was overbuilt by a second franchised rival in 1971, penetration rose
from 60% to over 90% even as saturation16 0 rose from 65% to greater
than 90%.'s' Similarly, when an existing supplier in Allentown, Penn-
sylvania overbuilt in the early 1960's, penetration rose from 80% to
almost 100% and saturation, which had been a paltry 30%, rose to
95%, also due to "a wiring race.""n 2 While consolidation of an existing
overbuild lowers penetration slightly, 6" an overbuilding entrant has
never been identified as lowering total penetration.'" Hence, there
seems little reason to fear overbuilds on consumer welfare grounds.
Potential entry is a viable, dynamic force for disciplining incum-
bents to act in the consumers' interests. 63 If entry is possible, the
proconsumer consequences of competition may be unleashed either by
entry or by the appropriate price lowering and quality enhancing re-
sponses of the incumbent supplier. The mere existence of a sole sup-
plier, regardless of how product and geographic markets are defined,
does not necessarily indicate the existence of a natural monopoly prob-
lem. Indeed, where we observe incumbents reacting to potential en-
trants with improved cable packages, the evidence suggests that the sur-
vival of a motivated sole supplier actually reflects the market's
160 Saturation is the ratio of homes in a franchise area that have cable available to
them, or the proportion of a community "wired for cable." Penetration, on the other
hand, is the percentage of those homes passed by cable that actually subscribe.
161 See Booz Allen, supra note 58, app. at 5. I
162 See id. at IV-5, app. at 1.
"163 See id. app. at 16. The Salisbury, Maryland cable overbuild, consolidated in
1960, saw penetration fall 5% from "about" 95% to 90%.
16 This is simply an empirical endorsement of the proper interpretation of the
sunk cost fallacy. See supra note 73.
16S Even some regulators have been tempted to rely on the market's competitive
structure to discipline firms in the consumer's interest. In Dade County, Florida a
franchised cable firm may apply to compete in rival franchise areas after wiring 80 to
85% of its own service area. See Declaration of John M. Mansell, supra note 159, at
17-18.
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competitive structure.1 66
III. COMPETITION: To ATTRACT CONSUMERS OR TO
SECURE-THE FRANCHISE?
A. Political Competition and Consumer Welfare
Cities and their consultants often contend that their franchising
processes generate gains for consumers that would not otherwise be re-
alized. Creating a legal monopoly through the franchising process and
then exacting some part of the monopoly gains through various politi-
cally imposed requirements1 67 can promote services that would not be
provided in the absence of such a monopoly. 168 This contention, how-
ever, confirms the suspicion that such services are not worth their cost
to consumers; otherwise a private, unregulated firm would be able to
provide them profitably. Moreover, the notion that government licens-
ing and auctioning can encourage the provision of some additional ser-
vices is not indicative of any special feature of cable television but is
applicable to monopoly creation in any industry.
Suppose local governments could franchise laundromats. In ex-
change for the municipal laundromat franchise, a city or county might
be able to obtain a new city hall, a convention center, or a basketball
arena. Is this good public policy? The worthiness of the benefit is not
here at issue; the efficiency and equity of the payment plan is. A gov-
ernment could always elect to provide these public facilities and to pay
for them out of its general tax revenues. Under the franchising pro-
gram, a government would specifically tax consumers of laundromat
services with monopoly prices. As a general policy it is more efficient to
allow open competition between laundromats and to raise revenues di-
rectly through general tax levies than to create a monopoly franchise
that would restrict the supply of laundry services to monopoly levels in
the short run, and that could deprive consumers of advantageous inno-
vations in laundry technology in the long run.
It is not literally true that cable "operators predictably pass the
cost to the subscribers."16 Instead the monopoly franchise directly acts
to limit both the actual and potential supply. The entry barrier created
166 Interestingly, a similar implication is drawn when the incumbent responds by
taking action in -court or in city hall to deny legal admission to such competitors.
167 See Posner's comment supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
'" For instance, when examining six private overbuilt cable systems, Touche
Ross concludes, "Public access and local origination services are very limited." Touche
Ross & Co., supra note 74, at 30.
169 Lee, supra note 17, at 909.
1986]
1382 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
by this implicit limitation on supply prompts prospective cable opera-
tors to offer cash and other valued resources to the local government
and influential constituencies in an amount up to the discounted value
of what is anticipated in excess of normal profits. Properly understood,
it is the monopoly franchise itself, not the costly public access or com-
munity grant requirements contained in most municipal franchises,
which increases the consumer's price for cable.170 Available evidence
indicates that cable consumers tend in disproportionate numbers to be
low to middle income individuals, implying that the cable tax burden is
distributionally perverse. Webb reports that national data demonstrate
that "low-income families spen[d] more dollars on basic cable than d[o]
middle-income families," and suggests that "low-income [urban] fami-
lies may find that basic cable provides an inexpensive substitute for the
other kinds of entertainment that the city offers."117 ' These data support
the conclusion that "special taxes on cable, such as municipal franchise
fees, fall heavily on low-income groups.
1 7 2
Moreover, whatever the income of the cable viewer, broader public
policy concerns mandate that taxes be explicit and visible, rather than
tucked away as an implicit, unquantified proportion of the cable cus-
tomer's monthly charge. To the extent that politicians can appropriate
resources without directly approaching citizens with a budgetary re-
quest or allocation, political bodies will tend to expend resources in
excess of the spending actually desired by constituents, creating a classic
free-rider problem. This can also be seen as an informational efficiency
dilemma. Because monopoly prices are inherently hidden taxes in the
170 Lee does state the case correctly elsewhere in pointing out that when Phoenix,
Arizona was opened to three citywide cable television competitors, "[t]he number of
channels and nonrevenue-producing services that the competing firms offer[ed was]
substantially less than the number that major market firms facing no competition of-
fer." Id. at 874 n.33 (citation omitted). The firms did not foresee monopoly resources
sufficient to pay for such services, and hence, the city could not obtain such services in
pursuing its competitive franchising policy.
171 G. WEBB, supra note 101, at 70.
17. Id. Low-income individuals tend to be much more heavily concentrated in ur-
ban locations. City franchises routinely require universal service at uniform rates and
may continue to do so even after deregulation under the Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984. "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as prohibiting any Federal
agency, State, or a franchising authority from-() prohibiting discrimination among
customers of basic cable service . . . ." Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,
§ 623(0, 47 U.S.C. § 543(0 (Supp. III 1985). Consequently, a price discrimination
scheme is created that favors affluent suburbanites residing on the relatively low density
fringes of urban centers. "The most attractive areas for cable are those with more than
seventy-five housing units per mile, and the best spots often have at least twice that
concentration. 'People who live on two-acre plots are not good business targets for us,'
says Monroe Rifkin, president of American Television & Communications, the nation's
second-largest cable company." Bernstein, supra note 86, at 67.
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sense that taxpayers remain uninformed as to the costs of public ex-
penditures and the distribution of these costs, there is no reliable mech-
anism by which the pattern of taxing and spending may be adjusted to
democratic preferences.
Insofar as cities claim that monopoly franchising allows an in-
crease in programming diversity, they make a counterintuitive ap-
peal. 73 How can limiting entry to one firm, when other firms stand
ready and eager, increase diversity? Yet this claim is accurate in the
following sense: a legal monopoly will often provide particular services
that would not be forthcoming under more competitive conditions.
Hence diversity is increased for those who value the additional services
subsidized by the monopoly franchise arrangement, but not through the
market process of consumers voting with their dollars. Like most attri-
butes pleasing to consumers, diversity is in the subjective eye of the
beholder. The Soviet Union could create a Ministry of Diversity, and
promote new and different perspectives as determined by the Ministry.
One suspects that these promotions, however, would have little to do
with the citizenry's preferences for innovative thought. The advantage
of open market selection is that it spontaneously distributes rewards in
the form of profits to those entrepreneurs who most efficiently meet
consumers' preferences for diversity. The political selection of product
or service, whether conducted by panel, committee, council, or public
hearing, cannot match the vastly more efficient selection that takes
place in the open marketplace.'
173 "[A] primary objective, and result, of Sacramento's franchising process is an
increase in the diversity of communications within the Sacramento community. Such
diversity is enhanced by (among other things) large channel capacity, public and leased
access, community use, and the SCT [Sacramento Community Trust] system of
grants." Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction
at 45, Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, No. CIV S-83-1034 MLS (E.D.
Cal. May 9, 1985). The cost only of the cash grants provided for in the 1984 Sacra-
mento cable franchise agreement to encourage diversity through SCT awards amounts
to $1.04 per customer per month. This amount excludes franchise fees, and the capital
costs of excess channel capacity and of physical facilities. See Declaration of Frederick
Bolte at exhibit 15A, table 2, in id.
174 A first amendment question arises as well. The Ninth Circuit addressed just
this question in Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396
(9th Cir. 1985), affd., 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986). Although the city claimed that the
plaintiff had no right to construct its own cable system and that the plaintiff's right to
free speech was fully protected by the general availability of mandated public access
program space available for its use on the franchised monopoly cable, Judge Sneed
disagreed:
We reject the contention that the City's access requirements provide com-
plete protection for the exercise of expressive rights. Arranging program-
ming for an entire cable television system entails engaging in a wide vari-
ety of protected activities. Substituting the chance to share a few
mandatory access and leased access channels with others for the right to
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Forced by federal policy to abandon the price regulation argument
for monopoly franchising, local governments increasingly assert not that
franchising will produce an efficient quasi-competitive outcome but that
it will simply redistribute the monopolists' profits in a socially desirable
way: the franchise will be issued in exchange for a commitment to pro-
vide various nonprofitable services. 17 Such an exchange does not elimi-
nate monopolist inefficiency, but simply redirects monopoly profits.
Moreover, it transfers these profits in a form that wastes economic re-
sources. One expert witness presented the diversity argument as
follows:
The franchising process typically induces not only added
channel capacity, but also commitments of financial support
for local programming that would not be made if there were
open market entry without franchising. Operators would
generally not make significant investments in local origina-
tion and access programming because they generally do not
believe that there is a sufficient financial return on invest-
ment in these services. They make such commitments pri-
marily to increase their chances of selection in franchising
competitions. 176
This argument is of crucial importance to the economic defense of
operate an entire cable system necessarily diminishes PCI's opportunity to
engage in such protected activities. A law allowing free expression in pub-
lic parks only for a few minutes at 6 a.m. hardly provides an adequate
replacement for the right to free, untrammeled debate in that forum....
... The City's argument is hard to distinguish from an assertion
that a law prohibiting Mr. X or Mrs. Y from publishing a newspaper is
valid, so long as each is provided an adequate space to print his or her
message in already existing newspapers. Obviously, such a law would be
invalid.
754 F.2d at 1410 (footnote omitted).
"I5 In an exclusive franchising situation, nonprice controls can at best channel
some portion of the monopolist's excess returns to various constituencies. For instance,
a city government could theoretically auction a franchise to the firm bidding the highest
lump sum or the highest present value of a periodic payment stream. The monopolist
willing to pay the most would be the one planning to charge profit-maximizing monop-
oly prices. Under this scenario, the city government could take the excess returns for
itself, but the result would still be classic monopolistic inefficiency, because marginal
customers are priced out of the market even where they are willing to pay above the
firm's marginal, or even average, costs. In any case, as was noted earlier, such an
auction is illegal under federal law. See generally Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, § 622(b), 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (Supp. 111 1985) (limiting franchise fees to 5% of
gross revenues per year); G. WEBB, supra note 101, at 159-78 (discussing the franchis-
ing process and taking the situation in Philadelphia as a specific example).
176 Declaration of Jay C. Smith at 18-19, Group W Cable v. City of Santa Cruz,
No. C-84-7546-WWS (N.D. Cal. hearing date Aug. 30, 1985).
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franchising because it forthrightly abandons any pretense of efficiency.
In noting that the municipal auction encourages the provision of ser-
vices not worth their cost to consumers, the argument actually advocates
inefficiency as a justification for, franchising. In contrast, unregulated
cable operators have every incentive to supply all services, but only
those services, for which consumers are ready to pay.177
In an efficient market, suppliers give consumers just as much
product as consumers are willing and able to buy; to oversupply one
market (i.e., to push more product on consumers than they can "af-
ford") is to undersupply some other market or markets, with the result
that consumer satisfaction will not be maximized. This latter allocation
of resources, then, is classically inefficient in that it takes scarce re-
sources out of relatively valuable uses and diverts them to uses in which
they produce smaller consumer benefits.
The unfranchised cable television market is particularly efficient
at supplying exactly those services for which consumers will pay. Un-
like some other video media, cable programming is easily excludable;
the public good or free-rider problem is thereby reduced. In contrast, a
broadcast television station may have trouble supplying an expensive
operatic production to its audience, for instance, even if sufficient de-
mand exists to justify its cost, because the station will have difficulty
charging opera devotees for the shows that they desire. The great ad-
vantage of cable is that, through subscriptions, tiering, premium chan-
nels, and pay per view, suppliers can more easily identify and capture
particular demands. As Eli Noam notes:
A[n] . . . advantage that cable affords over traditional
television is that it permits the operator to impose a charge
for the viewing of specific programs. The possibility of such
per-program pay-cable revolutionizes the program offering
on cable because it permits programs and services with much
higher production budgets." 8
Noam concludes by observing that cable is so efficient in extracting
payments in accord with the intensity of consumer demand that
277 A rational profit-maximizing monopolist will elect to serve any submarket in
which marginal revenues gained exceed marginal costs incurred, just as a competitive
firm would so choose. The monopolist might also, however, be able to raise prices
above competitive levels, thus diminishing consumer demand. But it would be unprofit-
able for the monopolist to impose a supra-competitive price that eliminates the entire
submarket. In other words, a monopolist would rationally serve any submarket that a
competitor would serve.
178 Noam, Local Distribution Monopolies in Cable Television and Telephone
Service: The Scope for Competition, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION TODAY
AND ToMORRow 362 (E. Noam ed. 1983).
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"[i]ndeed, one can expect the most desirable programs, i.e., those whose
consumer surplus is highest, to be largely siphoned from free television
and moved to pay-television." '"
The significance of Noam's conclusion should not be overlooked.
To argue that cable firms would not, in -a competitive environment,
provide the sorts of services that local governments select clearly attests
to the inefficiency generated by the franchising process. Since the
profit-maximizing strategy in a competitive environment is to provide
all increments of capacity and programming that consumers value more
than the opportunity cost, political selection of cable services has a neg-
ative impact on social welfare by imposing the supply of services worth
less than their cost.
The level of economic waste induced by the franchising process is
apparently significant. If, as cities assert, the cost of supplying cable
services consists largely of sunk costs, and municipalities must continu-
ally police franchisees to assure compliance with franchise terms re-
garding the provision of public access and local origination program-
ming, for example, the reluctance of cable firms to offer such low
variable cost services must demonstrate a virtual vacuum of demand.'""
The legal stance of both franchiser and franchisee belies any eco-
nomic efficiency rationale for monopoly franchising. The municipalities
argue that they must issue exclusive franchises conditional upon the
public interest, but possess no mechanism for eliminating monopoly
pricing, and no objective, nonpolitical process by which to measure the
consumer value of forced service requirements. The cable firms holding
franchises assert that cities should issuo exclusive franchises without
which the firms could not deliver the full complement of nonremunera-
tive cable services.""" The cities concur, and dutifully defend their mo-
179 Id.
ISO Local regulators often claim that their jobs consist largely of enforcing compli-
ance with franchise terms. Susan Herman, Los Angeles' top cable administrator and
formerly an assistant to New York City's cable director, said: "When I used to go home
in New York to view my cable, it was not to watch it. It was to flip through to ensure
that what they were obligated to carry they were carrying .... That was really bor-
ing." Decker, Doing Battle in the L.A. Cable Wars, L.A. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, at II-
1, col. 1, HI-10, col. 1.
"I' When urging rate deregulation, the industry argues that it is highly competi-
tive with broadcast television, SMATV, DBS, and home videos, and that it has no
monopoly power.
Thomas Wheeler, president of the National Cable-Television Associ-
ation . . . said only a little more than half of the 35 million homes with
access to cable-TV subscribe to it, so the service clearly isn't essential.
Cable-TV is far from a monopoly, and its prices will be kept in line by
competition from commercial and public TV, radio, video cassettes, movies
and new technology in the offing, he contends.
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nopoly franchising authority in the courts precisely on these grounds.
Yet this sequence of litigative causality gives the lie to the efficient
regulation argument. Natural monopoly is considered problematic be-
cause the incumbent producer in the market has cost advantages that
overwhelm potential competitors such that prices remain monopolistic
without inviting entry. Cable monopoly franchises, however, may
squander the entire sum of excess returns on politically demanded ser-
vices while the firm remains profitable, that is, recovers both its varia-
ble and fixed costs. For the firm to insist, and for the city to agree, that
the "solution to natural monopoly" cannot be sustained without a le-
gally enforced long-term monopoly franchise, must mean that the city
demands more for its franchise than the free entry, unfranchised mo-
nopolist could afford. The municipal policy of erecting legal entry bar-
riers so as to enforce the contract for certain nonremunerative services
actually results in the creation, rather than the dissipation, of monopoly
power.
18 2
B. Actual and Potential Competition in an Open Market
for Cable Television
The fact that there is some cost advantage to spacing firms geo-
graphically should have little bearing on public policy."" As Owen and
Greenhalgh suggest, firms that are willing to compete should be al-
lowed to do so.'" Just as there are rarely four convenience stores on
the same corner, or two pet stores in the same shopping center, the
proximity of competition is clearly an important element in a cable
firm's profit-maximizing irivestment decision. But importantly, not only
does the cable entrant internalize the costs of overbuilding; it reaps the
net advantages as well. If the firm has a substantially better product
than the incumbent, or a more efficient business organization, or both,
the duplication cost may well be outweighed by an efficiency gain and
Crock, supra note 122, at 30, col. 5.
182 This analysis does not demonstrate a total absence of monopoly power in a
free market, only that it is insufficient to subsidize the effective payment required by
the franchising authority. When a study that assumes natural monopoly claims support
for exclusive licensing based partly on the fact that "[ilnterviews indicate that munici-
palities consider a single system operator more likely to fulfill franchise commitments,"
Booz Allen, supra note 58, at IV-18, it reveals that the discipline of open market
competition is a tighter proconsumer constraint on firms than are the local regulators.
Moreover, it logically follows that political agents have an interest in suppressing com-
petition for consumers, to better enable political exchanges and cross-subsidies to be
effectuated.
183 See Owen & Greenhalgh, supra note 94, at 76.
'" See id. at 78.
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the firm will rationally choose to invest.185 The mere possibility that
such a calculation to enter could be made by an outsider will tend to
deter an insider from monopolistic behavior. The existence of just one
pet store per shopping mall neither implies monopoly, nor suggests
public franchising; any foreclosure of the possibility of new pet shops
moving into the mall would lessen the threat of potential competition,
which effectively serves to regulate pricing practices.
Any credible natural monopoly argument must also address the
issue of cross-substitution for the services that cable firms supply. If
ready substitutes abound, then no true monopoly is said to exist, in that
even a sole cable supplier will face effective competitive pressure from
suppliers of rival products. Hence, consumers are protected from ex-
ploitation under an open market policy.
Proponents of municipal cable franchising, however, often ignore
cross-substitution altogether and aim to convince courts and legislative
bodies that a market with only one cable firm is prima facie evidence of
natural monopoly. In the federal regulatory context, however, substi-
tutes are to be considered in any analysis of cable television markets. In
the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Congress specifically
instructed the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to identify
the geographic markets in which effective competition existed." 6 Such
markets were slated for basic rate deregulation. Rather than simply un-
dertake an analysis of directly overbuilt cable markets (the pro forma
approach to competition taken by municipal governments), the FCC
focused on traditional broadcast television as a competitor to cable. In
declining to extend its analysis beyond this one potential source of ri-
valry, the Commission deemed effective competition to exist in any
community where three B-contour grade television signals were re-
ceived. 117 Thus, federal policy, as established by Congress and the
18 Overbuilding is likely to be the market response in such circumstances; impor-
tantly, it is the socially efficient response. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying
text.
18 See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, § 623(b)(1), 47 U.S.C. §
543(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
187 The Cable Act specifically charges the Commission with the responsibil-
ity of defining effective competition ....
We .'. . conclude that the existence of three or more off-the-air
broadcast signals in the cable market provides viewers with adequate pro-
gramming choices and presents an effective constraint on the market
power of a cable system in the provision of basic service .... Accord-
ingly, a cable system will be considered to face effective competition when-
ever the franchise market receives three or more unduplicated broadcast
signals.
FCC Report and Order, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637, 18,648 91, 18,650 100 (May 2,
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FCC, clearly regards the presence of intermedia competition as central
to the issue of monopoly versus competition in cable television.
While the FCC felt no compulsion to go beyond consideration of
traditional broadcast television as a rival to cable television, the number
of additional sources of intermedia competition are impressive.188 In
fact, these alternatives to cable have led one group of prominent cable
industry analysts, without consideration of the feasibility of cable-on-
cable competition, to conclude that "cable systems lack the economic
and legal attributes of a natural monopoly and that all major markets
and submarkets in which cable competes or is likely to compete are
workably competitive with a number of alternative suppliers." 1 9
In investigating the monopoly question with regard to cable televi-
sion, these analysts preceded the FCC in concentrating on the availabil-
ity of intermedia substitution. While "it is physically possible to build a
second cable system," the analysis notes that other delivery systems
utilizing "broadcast, microwave, or telephone distribution may be less
costly."1 '9 Given the importance of contestability in current monopoly
theory, an examination of rival video and information services is cru-
cial. If high fixed entry costs are no longer considered sufficient to
demonstrate the presence of a natural monopoly, any allegation of nat-
ural monopoly must demonstrate a dearth of potential competitors with
low sunk costs. The accepted economic analysis, then, would require a
1985) (footnote omitted). The report goes on to define a signal: "[A] signal will be
counted for purposes of effective competition if it places a predicted Grade B contour
over any portion of the cable community or is significantly viewed within the cable
community." Id. at 18,651 107 (footnote omitted). Eighty-seven percent of cable sys-
tems have been released from rate regulation under the effective competition standard.
See D. Patrick, Cable's Brave New World 2 (speech at the Western Cable Show,
Anaheim, Cal., Dec. 5, 1985).
188 Indeed, the 1985 FCC report on effective competition noted the importance of
nonbroadcast cable rivals.
In adopting this definition [of effective competition], we do not mean to
minimize the importance of the various alternative sources of video pro-
gramming such as multipoint distribution services, direct satellite recep-
tion, and video cassette recorders. Such services are significant providers of
video programming services and do, in fact, offer competition to cable
services.
FCC Report and Order, supra note 187, at 18,649 1 98 (footnotes omitted); see also
Note, Defining the Relevant Product Market of the New Video Technologies, 4 CAR-
DOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 75, 101 (1985) (footnotes omitted) ("Studies indicate that
consumers do not distinguish among the different technical methods that produce a
picture on the television screen. Similarly, consumers do not differentiate . . . between
a technology that can deliver 100 channels of programming and a technology that can
deliver five extra channels.").
z"' Shooshan, Jackson, & Kahn, Cable Television: The Monopoly Myth and
Competitive Reality 3 (April 1982) (unpublished manuscript).
190 Id. at 6-7 (footnote omitted).
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showing that alternative suppliers are nonexistent, or if present, possess
characteristics consistent with the existence of natural monopoly them-
selves. The most important of these characteristics would be a level of
capital fixity sufficient to create large exit costs.
Excluding broadcast television, the primary sources of competition
to cable are: satellite master antenna television (SMATV), satellite tel-
evision (TVRO), direct broadcast satellite television (DBS), multichan-
nel multipoint distribution systems (MCTV), and video cassette record-
ers (VCR). I will briefly explain each technological substitute and its
competitive relationship to cable television.
SMATV: Hooking a satellite receiver disk up to the master an-
tenna of an apartment, condominium, hotel, trailer park, hospital, or
other relatively high-density housing complex constitutes a form of di-
rect competition with cable television in such submarkets. In fact, there
can be no doubt that these private cable systems are perceived as a
competitive threat: city governments and monopoly cable franchisees
have repeatedly challenged SMATV competitors in court. 91 Particu-
larly interesting are instances where an SMATV supplier has used mi-
crowave technology to beam satellite signals from one wired building to
the next, prompting the local government to claim regulatory jurisdic-
tion over the public rights of way several stories above the ground. As
the New York Times noted, "Local governments . . . have in recent
years grown worried about the proliferation of master antenna systems,
because such systems are often used by landlords or condominium as-
sociations in lieu of cable, reducing the cable operators' revenues and
hence the payment of local franchise fees." '92
Interestingly, the FCC has defended SMATV's ability to compete
against traditional cable services. The Commission intervened to bar
local regulation of satellite systems located on private property: "We're
not saying the states can't regulate satellite dishes from a standpoint of
public safety or zoning, but we are saying they can't regulate or pro-
hibit S.M.A.T.V. service simply because it's a competitive threat to
cable television."193
191 See supra note 154.
192 F.C.C. Bars Local Satellite-TV Rules, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1983, at D10,
cols. 1, 2.
193 Id. at D10, col. 3 (comments of James C. McKinney, chief of the FCC's Mass
Media Bureau). One commentator states bluntly: "Most cable operators would be very
happy to squelch SMATV, whose operators often build within a cable system's suppos-
edly exclusive franchise area. The cable industry has persuaded legislatures in 11
states . . . to keep SMATV operators from striking exclusive agreements with manag-
ers of so-called multidwelling-unit complexes." Traub, SMATV: Fighting Cable with
Cable, 5 CHANNELS OF COMM., Nov./Dec. 1985, at 43 (1986 Field Guide).
CATV clearly recognizes SMATV as being an effective competitor. Whereas the
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SMATV's ability to compete with traditional cable is precisely
what has distressed some local governments. The largest private cable
system has been established in the Bronx at Co-Op City, the nation's
largest apartment complex, with approximately 15,000 apartments and
60,000 residents, which contracted for a 108-channel state-of-the-art
system.19 ' New York City's CATV franchise for the Bronx claims its
market is not viable if it must compete in the borough-and so the city
and state have brought legal actions to halt the private cable system.19 5
SMATV suppliers are so competitive that a local government's ability
to arrange political trades through franchising is seriously threatened
by the existence of such systems. "The presence of SMATV operators
in franchise areas angers many cable operators, who expect the assis-
tance of municipalities in getting rid of unwelcomed competition."198
With federal policy now tilted toward free entry, however, com-
petitive behavior can be observed. In Pompano Beach, Florida, Telsat
Cablevision, a subsidiary of Florida Power and Light offering
SMATV, has budgeted $24 million to wire "at least 150,000 dwelling
units by autumn, 1988."1" The system's manager "says he enjoys com-
peting head-to-head with cable systems. . . . It's not unusual for our
prices to be half of what the franchised cable operator is charging. We
can offer 25 channels of basic services for $7.00 or $8.00 a month, and
that includes extra outlets.""' Meanwhile, cable monopolists in Flor-
ida paradoxically claim that competing "with the fifth largest investor-
owned utility in the country . . . does not lend itself to free and open
marketplace competition from the cable operator's point of view."' 99
rivalry of CATV and SMATV for landlords' business could certainly create a competi-
tive outcome in multidwelling submarkets, the eagerness of legislative bodies to bar
such competition reveals an intent to advance special interest protectionism at the ex-
pense of efficiency.
19 See SMATV, supra note 150, at 33.
198 Satellite Television of N.Y. Assocs. v. Finneran, 579 F. Supp. 1546 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (granting an injunction to prevent enforcement of state commission's cease and
desist orders restraining construction of SMATV system at Co-op City in the Bronx).
1I See SMATV, supra note 150, at 46.
1' Southern Discomfort, CABLE TELEVISION Bus., Dec. 1, 1985, at 12.
198 Id.
199 Id. Another writer observes:
[SMATV's] potential for growth is enormous. Cablecom, Inc., a Chicago
SMATV operator, provides pay-TV services to some of the city's most
prestigious lakefront residences, where cable operators have yet to string
their wires. The company sells a six-channel package, including movies
and news, for $19.95 a month. But it is developing a 60-channel 'ad-
dressable' SMATV system, which would allow viewers to select specific
programs on a pay-per-view basis.
Wines, Cable Companies Fall Victim to Overpromises, Competition for Viewers, 16
NAT'L J., Feb. 18, 1984, at 314, 316. Another commentator explicitly describes
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TVRO: Satellite dishes, which are typically installed in the back-
yards of customers, now offer a wide range of television services. The
prices of such TVRO (television receive only) dishes have fallen dra-
matically since the mid-1970's. "Complete home receiving systems,
which once sold for as much as $36,000, now cost as little as $800.
Since the beginning of 1985 their number has been increasing by at
least 40,000 a month.2
20 0
TRVO represents a close substitute for cable television. Malarkey-
Taylor Associates, a cable industry consulting firm, finds that "one-
third of the total home dish systems sold today are used in cabled ar-
eas."201 Moreover, dishes are evidently less costly than CATV in
sparsely populated neighborhoods; cable franchisees are moving to
"wire" such portions of their franchises with TVROs. In one survey,
14% of cable operators reported that they planned to enter the TVRO
market during 1986, despite the fact that "as little as two years ago
TVRO sales were considered virtual enemy territory."202
SMATV's ability to compete with traditional cable:
MATV competition has already been felt by several MSO's [multiple
cable system operators] with urban franchises. In Dallas and Houston,
franchise winner Warner Amex has been forced to build a temporary
"head-end" to provide immediate service as a counter to MATV activity.
MATV is also a competitive force in Tucson, Denver, Miami and New
York. Whereas cable companies may be willing to forego multiple dwell-
ings in sparsely populated areas, they stand to lose too much-perhaps
20% to 30% of their market area-in the major cities.
THE HOME VIDEO & CABLE Y.B., 1982-83, at 33.
200 Barbieri, Backyard Dishes: DBS By Any Other Name, 5 CHANNELS OF
COMM., Nov./Dec. 1985, at 54 (1986 Field Guide). Another source estimates that
monthly sales total approximately 60,000 TVROs per month. See TV Mushrooms in
the Backyard, TIME, Sept. 16, 1985, at 56.
One reason for impressive sales is piracy of signals. On Jan. 15, 1986, however,
Home Box Office (HBO) and Cinemax began scrambling their satellite-relayed signal
so that an expensive ($395) decoder is required, in addition to monthly charges, for
reception via backyard satellite dishes. Other pay television channels were also expected
to begin signal scrambling (encryption) by the end of the year. Nevertheless, more than
100 channels are still easily receivable using TVRO dishes. See Fantel, The Dish Own-
ers vs. the Scramblers, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1986, at 11-30, col. 1; Peterson, Scram-
bling of Signals Today Thwarts TV Dish Antennas, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1986, at Al,
col. 1. Most important here is the essential competitive issue: cable television is suppos-
edly a natural monopoly because firms must make a large nonsalvageable capital in-
vestment that arguably deters competitive entry. Placing TVRO dishes in competition
with traditional cable, however, does not require a prohibitive capital investment. If
significant barriers to entry in satellite programming existed, this would entail a market
power problem in programming, not in receiving.
201 Clayton, Home Earth Station Makers Gear Up to Meet Demand from Cable
Operators, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Dec. 2, 1985, at 29.
202 Firms Urge Cable On, CABLE TELEVISION Bus., 1985 Special Edition, at 10;
see also Clayton, supra note 201, at 29 (discussing cable operators entering TVRO
business). Rural telephone and electric co-ops have also entered the satellite dish busi-
ness. See Evancho, Clashing With Co-Ops, SATELLITE DEALER, Nov. 1985, at 39.
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The Canadian government, in fact, once prohibited its citizens
from owning TVROs. 03 The government ban was imposed, partly in
response to a request from Canadian cable operators who "[l]ike their
U.S. counterparts . . . considered [the home satellite TV industry] a
threat to their monopolistic position as carriers of premium signals."'2 04
Due to widespread noncompliance, the Canadian prohibition against
ownership of TVROs was repealed in 1983.205
DBS: Direct broadcast satellite television has already failed once as
a competitor of cable television. But rapidly changing costs, due to a
dynamic technology, have induced several large firms, including the
country's largest cable operator, to re-enter the market.,
DBS's technical advantage over TVRO is that the former utilizes
a stronger transmission frequency and thus may employ smaller,
cheaper dishes. Indeed, the standard DBS dish is just two to three feet
in diameter, as opposed to the typical TVRO dish, which is six to ten
feet in diameter. Eleven DBS suppliers are now planning to market
pay service packages consisting of up to sixteen channels each. As one
leading cable industry executive sees the competitive threat:
The future may not be cable friendly. The low cost and
early release of video movies has quelled the excitement of
past yeairs for cable movies. Before 1990, several DBS serv-
ices will appear with the same entertainment offerings as are
203 See Masters, A New Canadian Club, SATELLITE DEALER, Nov. 1985, at 68,
74.
2" Id.
205 See id.; see also Amendment of General Radio Regulations, Part II, 117 Can.
Gaz. 2087, 2088 (May 25, 1983) (Registration SOR/83-422, May 12, 1983) (explana-
tory note) ("This amendment exempts certain persons from the requirement to obtain a
licence under the Radio Act in order to possess and use earth stations for the reception
of a radio or television programming signal transmitted by a satellite operating in the
fixed satellite service.").
In the United States, the FCC has ruled that "the nation's cities . . . cannot out-
law satellite receiving dishes as a way to promote the growth of cable TV." Cities
Can't Ban Dishes to Help Cable's Growth, L.A. Times, Jan. 16, 1986, at VI-11, col 3;
see also In the Matter of Preemption of Local Zoning or Other Regulation of Receive-
Only Satellite Earth Stations, No. 85-87, FCC 86-28 (slip op. released Jan. 5, 1986)
(LEXIS, Fedcom library, FCC file); Stuart, F.C.C. Limits Rules Over TV Receivers,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1986, at A16, col. 1. This FCC decision suggests that the federal
agency perceives a monopolistic intent on the part of local authorities who have at-
tempted to restrict use of such-dishes through zoning regulations.
20 "A number of large cable operators, including the largest, Tele-Communica-
tions, Inc., are already planning to sell DBS services to unwired communities at prices
that will compete with cable-$6 to $20 a month." Barbieri, supra note 200, at 54.
Barbieri also notes that many believe that the initial failure of one DBS supplier,
United Satellite Communications, which sold a five channel service to fewer than
15,000 subscribers and incurred losses of $53 million in 17 months of operation be-
tween 1983 and 1985, was due to mismanagement. See id.
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available to cable. On the Ku band, the antenna, receiver
and decoder package will be under $500, far less than cur-
rent cable subscriber values."2°7
MCTV: Multichannel television (MCTV) has developed as a re-
placement for multipoint distribution system (MDS) television. The
old, single channel MDS television and subscription TV (STV), which
send a scrambled, pay channel over a normal, off-air UHF signal, have
been for the most part unable to compete with cable television, VCRs,
and TVROs. For instance, STV operators recently pulled out of Chi-
cago, Cincinnati, and Miami, leaving "New York, Los Angeles, and
Washington as the only big cities with STV service."208 From 1.5 mil-
lion subscribers early in this decade, current viewership has declined to
less than 300,000.09
Multiple pay channels delivered by microwave transmission sup-
plant the single channel pay service as a far more viable video service,
often called wireless cable. The FCC awarded eighteen licenses for
four-channel service in nine major markets in September, 1985, and
has plans to award hundreds more. 10 MCTV providers have already
begun leasing spectrum allocations from nonprofit institutions, which
own the rights to Instructional Television Fixed Service (ITFS)
bands,211 allowing MCTV broadcasters to begin operations in Wash-
ington, San Francisco, and Las Vegas even prior to the FCC's spec-
trum lottery.
212
While some industry sources claim that MCTV is primarily lim-
ited to serving as an inexpensive substitute for CATV in uncabled ar-
eas,"' the relevant market dynamics belie the logic of this claim. As
MCTV providers jump first into the uncabled areas of major urban
regions, their ability to preempt CATV successfully becomes evident.
According to the director of marketing for one MCTV firm in New
York City, "MCTV is not going to displace cable in cabled Manhat-
tan . . . but it may 'obviate the need for it' in New York's outer bor-
oughs (Queens, Brooklyn, Bronx, and Staten Island), which are not
207 Moving Beyond the Basics, CABLE MARKETING, Dec. 1985, at 16, 30 (com-
ments of Isaac S. Blonder, chairman of the board of directors of Blonder-Tongue).
208 Barbieri, STV: R.LP., 5 CHANNELS OF COMM., Nov./Dec. 1985, at 32 (1986
Field Guide).
209 See id.
210 See Wolf, Multichannel MDS: The Start of Something Small, 5 CHANNELS
OF COMM., Nov./Dec. 1985, at 34 (1986 Field Guide).
211 See id.
212 See id.
2I "The proponents of [MCTV] now concede that their medium can never go
head-to-head with cable; its niche is among the several million homes cable won't
reach." Id.
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and may never be wired." 21 The fact that MCTV could "obviate the
need" for cable television suggests that the service imposes a competitive
constraint even on established CATV systems, particularly those in
Manhattan, where MCTV firms may utilize existing channel frequen-
cies and exploit economies of scale in advertising and marketing. Essen-
tially, where a CATV operator attempts to indulge in apparent monop-
olistic behavior, MCTV suppliers could descend on the market without
investing extensively in nonsalvageable capital. Thus, even markets
with established CATV systems may be considered competitive in the
contestability sense. Hence, the first mover into a market may continue
to be its sole supplier, but may engage in monopoly pricing or other
behavior that restricts output only at the risk of encouraging entry by
low sunk-cost competitors. The fact that CATV may be unable to enter
those markets where MCTV was the first entrant implies the vitality of
MCTV as a rival to cable.215
VCRs: The video cassette recorder, perhaps the most significant
competitor of cable television, foregoes satellite and wire altogether.
Video cassette recorders are currently in 35% of all U.S. households, 16
and "[b]y conservative estimate, 55 percent of U.S. homes will have
VCRs by the end of 1990. "217 Sales are currently brisk: 11 million
VCRs were sold in America during 1985 as prices dropped to as low as
$199 per unit.
21 8
Academic research has revealed evidence on the substitutability of
VCRs for pay cable programming. In a 1984 FCC study, Jonathan D.
Levy and Peter Pitsch uncovered statistical relationships implying
"strong support to the proposition that VCR's and cable are substi-
tutes. 121  The authors additionally found evidence that CATV and
broadcast television are substitutes, 220 while broadcast television and
214 The Expanding World of Multichannel TV, BROADCASTING, Mar. 11, 1985,
at 38 (remarks of Bruce De Court, marketing director of Pay TV). De Court further
asserts that his firm's service "will be extremely competitive with cable." Id.
215 There is nothing that prevents MCTV "overbuilds" of CATV systems. "In
the Milwaukee market, Movie Systems Chairman Jack Stephens said he is pricing his
service to compete head-to-head with the cable operators in and around the city for new
subscribers." Id.
216 See Solomon, Cable TV is at a Crossroads-Trying to Figure Out What It
Ought to Be, 17 NAT'L J., Nov. 2, 1985, at 2478, 2482.
217 Lachenbruch, VCRs: From Gizmo to Household Word, 5 CHANNELS OF
COMM., Nov./Dec. 1985, at 74 (1986 Field Guide).
218 See id. at 75.
219 J. Levy & P. Pitsch, Statistical Evidence of Substitutability Among Video De-
livery Systems 27 (Apr. 26, 1984) (available through the FCC Office of Public Affairs).
220 See form cover letter from FCC accompanying J. Levy & P. Pitsch, supra
note 219 (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
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VCRs are complements.22' Hence, when television broadcast stations
are joined with VCRs by the consumer, as is typical, a strong competi-
tor to cable emerges.
222
For some consumers, a net convenience advantage may accrue to
VCRs, since the inconvenience of renting and returning a cassette can
be more than offset by the enhanced control over selection afforded by
large rental inventories and by the complete control the consumer exer-
cises over viewing times. The time costs of renting are being reduced as
supermarkets, gas stations, and convenience stores enter the video cas-
sette rental market.223 As player-only machines enter the market at a
price of about $100,224 and as cassette rental prices fall to between
$1.00 and $2.00, the cable industry will further react to competition
that is already causing HBO, the top domestic pay service, to pursue
the costly strategy of showing first run, big event programming, and
leading CATV systems to discount packages of pay channels. 25
This survey does not exhaust the list of potential technological ri-
vals to CATV. For instance, low power television (LPTV) may offer
increasing competition. Conceived in 1980, LPTV entails the licensing
of as many as 4000 additional broadcast television stations confined to
concentrated viewing areas.228 These signals may broadcast pay chan-
nels or programming supported by commercials. Thus far, 320 licenses
have been granted and the FCC has 40,000 applications on file.227
221 See id.
222 This conclusion is endorsed by a recent marketing survey, which found that
"Ic]able subscribers who have complaints about their service and are not satisfied with
a cable system's customer service are highly likely to own VCRs, to be heavy tape
renters and to record programs off the air .... " Study Finds VCR Owners Dissatis-
fied with Cable, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Dec. 2, 1985, at 75.
222 See, e.g., Picking Up a Movie, Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1986, at 35, col. 3 (citing a
survey showing that 83% of consumers who buy or rent video cassettes do so in video
stores, 16% in discount stores, 11% in department stores, 9% in grocery stores; figures
sum to more than 100% because consumers often shop for cassettes in more than one
type of retail outlet); Cieply, Despite Movie Rental Boom, It's 'The End' for Many
Shops, Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1985, at 25, col. 1 (stating that many small retail busi-
nesses-dry cleaners, drugstores, photo-finishing shops and even trailer rental
shops-are seeking to add video rentals to their ongoing businesses).
22" See Coates, Ad Agency Makes VCR Predictions, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Dec. 2,
1985, at 50.
2 See Solomon, supra note 216, at 2482 (describing HBO's efforts to provide
programming that is unavailable on prerecorded cassettes, such as concerts and boxing
matches, and the plan of a chain of cable franchisees in California to offer a package of
four pay television channels at a reduced monthly service charge).
228 See Couzens, LPTV: Queuing Up For A Long Shot, 5 CHANNELS OF COMM.,
Nov./Dec. 1985, at 28 (1986 Field Guide).
117 See id. Not included in this analysis of intermedia competition analysis is ri-
valry from the telephone industry. Such rivalry is prohibited by federal law.
To a large degree the welfare of the cable television industry is de-
pendent on protective legislation. Many of the services considered the ex-
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Certainly, the cable industry considers itself hemmed in by various
competitive encroachments; any natural monopoly analysis of CATV
must consider these substitute forms of video delivery. The FCC finds
that "the statistical evidence tends to support the proposition that the
video product market should be defined broadly-to include (at least)
broadcast television, cable, and VCR's. " 28 An analysis of CATV lim-
ited to that medium alone is inherently flawed by reliance on an ill-
defined product market.
clusive territory of cable television could, in fact, be supplied by other seg-
ments of the communications industry if they were allowed to by the
regulatory authorities. The telephone industry, for instance, has virtually
every television household in the country wired so that it could immedi-
ately provide various of the video and two-way services now promoted as
significant sources of revenue for cable television.
Warburg Paribas Becker, Inc., Five Year Performance Survey of the Cable TV Indus-
try (Dec. 1981), reprinted in CAL. PUBLIC BROADCASTING COMM'N, THE IMPACT OF
AB699: COMMUNITY SERVICE AND CABLE RATE DEREGULATION apps. at 19 (1982)
(footnote omitted). The same survey notes, "Video services include one-way data
printout. The telephone industry's plant does not have the ability to transmit pictures."
Id. at 19 n.1. The advent of fiber optics, however, may allow the telephone industry to
discover a superior medium for transmitting pictures than co-axial cable. See infra note
244. Senator John Danforth, the chair of the Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, crafted an important cable policy statement in his recent letter of July
22, 1986 to FCC Chair Mark Fowler. In it he suggested the possibility that both
telephone company competition to cable and the prohibition by federal law of the ex-
clusive cable franchise itself may be issues ripe for discussion.
The Senate will have the opportunity to reexamine the decision of Con-
gress to limit the provision of cable services by telephone companies (47
U.S.C. § 613) in the context of reviewing restrictions now imposed upon
the Regional Bell Operating Companies. Perhaps Congress may wish to
reexamine, as well, its decision allowing franchising authorities to grant
exclusive- cable franchises (47 U.S.C. § 621).
Letter from Sen. John C. Danforth to Mark S. Fowler, FCC Chairman (July 22,
1986) at n.17.
In a numerical projection concerning those technologies that are allowed to com-
pete, Dr. Jane Henry estimates that non-CATV pay video transmission suppliers, ex-
cluding VCRs and nonsubscription television, will have 15.75 million subscribers in the
United States by 1992. The largest CATV competitor will be MCTV (8.5 million
subscribers), followed by DBS (4.0 million), SMATV (2.5 million), and LPTV (.75
million). See Henry, supra note 150, at 52-55.
228 J. Levy & P. Pitsch, supra note 219, at 31. These three delivery systems men-
tioned are the only ones they tested for substitutability, hence their parenthetical use of
cat least."
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Table 2
Intermedia Competition for the Video Entertainment Market*
CATV SMATV TVRO DBS MCTV Broadcast TV VCR
# of Viewers 34,000,000 a 6 0 0 ,0 0 0 b 1,20 0,000c n.a. n.a. 8 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 d 25,000,000
e
(households)
Year begun 1948f  1979-80g 19 7 6 h 1983
i  1984i 1 9 4 6k 19771
(approx.)
Capital cost $900- $200- $600- <$500P $3 0 0q trivial $2 50
r
per viewing S1 ,2 0 0 m $400
n  $1,5000
household
Henry's "Avg. $765s  $230 s  n.a. $440 n.a. n.a. n.a.
investment/
subscriber"'X
Channel 1 10 1 108U 123v 16(each)w 29X 82 -
capacity
Nontrivial Yes No No No No No No
sunk cost?
a Solomon, Cable TV is at a Crossroads-Trying to Figure Out What It Ought to Be, 17 NAT'L
J., Nov. 2, 1985, at 2478, 2482.
b N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1983, at D10, col. 1.
c TV Mushrooms in the Backyard, TIME, Sept. 16, 1985, at 56 (number of existing satellite dishes
in 1985).
d Revenues, Expenses, and Earnings-Television Stations: 1946-1980, 51 TELEVISION AND
CABLE FACrBOoK 36 (Television Digest Inc.) (1983).
C Lachenbruch, VCR's From Gizmo to Household Word, 5 CHANNELS OF COMM. Nov./Dec.
1985, at 74 (1986 Field Guide).
f Robinson, Introduction and General Background, in DEREGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION 1,
5 (P. MacAvoy ed. 1977); Letter from Sen. John C. Danforth to Mark S. Fowler, FCC chair-
man (July 22, 1986) ("The cable industry generally is recognized as having started in Mahanoy
City [Pennsylvania] in 1948.").
g SMATV: The Medium That's Making Cable Nervous, BROADCASTING, June 21, 1982, at 33.
h Barbieri, Backyard Dishes: DBS By Any Other Name, 5 CHANNELS OF COMM., Nov./Dec.
1985, at 54.
'The Dish v. The Cable, NEwswEFx, June 6, 1983, at 75 (DBS broadcasts scheduled to begin in
Oct., 1983).
The Expanding World of Multichannel TV, BROADCASTING, Mar. 11, 1985, at 38 (a four-
channel system was introduced in Washington D.C. in December of 1984).
k Revenues, Expenses and Earnings-Television Stations: 1946-1980, supra note d, at 6 (in
1946, there were 10 U.S. television stations with total revenues of $500,000).
'U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1980, 835
(100th ed. 1981) (1977 was the first year for which figures for VCR's are given).
'Wall Street J., April 1, 1983, at 1, col. 6; Wines, Cable Companies Fall Victim to Over-
promises, Competition for Viewers, 16 NAT'L J., Feb. 18, 1984, at 314, 315.
n Cherry Picking for Profit, COMM. ENGINEERING & DESIGN, Dec. 1985, at 77, 80. Higher esti-
mate from cost structure of Co-op City, a residential development in the Bronx and assuming a
50% penetration ratio, as reported in SMATV, supra note g, at 38.
'Firms Urge Cable On, CABLE TELEVISION Bus., 1985 Special Edition, at 10.
P CABLE MARKETING, Dec. 1985, at 30.20.
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q Touche Ross & Co., Financial and Economic Analysis of the Cable Television Permit Policy of
the City and County of Denver 47 (Jan. 20, 1984), citing Boyle, Multichannel to be Less Costly
Than Cable: Microband, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Mar. 14, 1983, at 21.
r Lachenbruch, supra note e, at 74.
'Taken from Henry, supra note t, at 19. Henry's numbers specifically refer to "Average Trans-
mission and Subscriber Investment Per Potential Subscriber" (Table 1.14, at 54).
t Wall Street J., Apr. 1, 1983, at 1, col. 6. According to the article, a "state of the art" cable
system would have a 110 channel capacity.
u SMATV, supra note g, at 33 (example taken from proposed SMATV system for Co-Op City, a
residential development in Bronx, New York).
v CommTek Pub. Co., Tuning in to Satellite TV, at v (1984) (promotional pamphlet). The pam-
phlet suggests that satellite dishes in general have a 123 channel capacity.
w Once Upon a Time in America?, SATELLITE WORLD, Dec. 1985 at 16-17.
'Henry, The Economics of Pay-TV Media, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPETrTION, 19, 31 (E. Noam ed.
1985) (Henry refers to multichannel microwave distribution services [MMDS], which is another
name for the transmission system known as Multichannel Television [MCTV].).
* As stated in the text, this table is included to facilitate the author's discussion of broadcasting
systems that can serve as alternatives to cable. It is not meant to be a precise analysis of the
market characteristics of industry competitors.
A listing of intermedia competitors to cable, such as that in table
2, is enlightening in two regards. First, it illustrates that per subscriber
capital costs for cable alternatives are competitive with cable; the com-
petitive advantage of CATV due to the economic efficiency of spreading
fixed capital charges over an entire market is shown to be suspect.229
Second, the important substitutes to CATV uniformly require rela-
tively small nonsalvageable capital investments. For example, firms
supply satellite television broadcasts by renting transmission services on
orbiting satellites; hence, they have virtually no sunk investment. On
the receiving end of satellite transmissions, viewers subscribe by
purchasing satellite dishes that themselves may be relocated and are
therefore salvageable.230 Because TVROs, SMATV, DBS, VCRs,
broadcast television, and MGTV do not require suppliers to make large
and nonsalvageable investments in order to enter the market, the video
entertainment market is plausibly contestable. Hence, the demonstra-
tion that CATV systems are spatially separated is of limited value in
drawing conclusions on the competitiveness of a correctly defined mar-
229 The figures appearing in table 2 are not intended to be exact projections of
actual costs, which, of course, vary from market to market. They are, however, esti-
mates taken from published or industry expert sources. They should serve as highly
plausible guesstimates no less reliable than the projections made by municipally re-
tained analysts to support the claim that high fixed costs make direct cable competition
impractical and uneconomical. Hence, the inevitable imprecision of cost estimates is
properly a greater cause of concern for those who argue that such forecasts create a case
for legal monopoly. At a minimum, it is not persuasive to bolster a natural monopoly
argument with a set of suspect numbers, and then to dismiss cross-competition due to
the problems inherent in relying on other imperfect numbers.
230 Capital mobility is epitomized by the satellite dishes now on the market, which
may be attached to recreational vehicles.
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ket in which CATV competes.
C. The Obvious and Hidden Costs of Political Rent-Creation
Even on its own terms, the argument for a monopoly franchise is
today a curiosity in the cable market, given current federal policy. In
the traditional view of natural monopoly regulation, a monopoly
franchise serves solely to facilitate a regulatory scheme. An argument
exists for regulation without a monopoly franchise, that is, regulation of
a de facto monopoly, but there has never been a proconsumer argument
monopoly franchise without price regulation." 1 Recently, a peculiar
regulatory arrangement has evolved: because Congress has legislated a
phasing out of local control over cable television prices, the argument
for monopoly franchising dissolves into a blank check for monopoly
power.2 2 It is suspect to argue against the efficacy of market forces in
regulating cable prices and services in the consumer's interest when the
alternative is legal monopoly with no price regulation. The assertion
that unregulated private monopoly without the possibility of competi-
tive entry is better for consumers than unregulated private monopoly
with the possibility of competitive entry is simply not credible.
A policy of exclusive franchising without price regulation may ef-
fectively limit supply but does not limit monopoly pricing. Further-
more, the dead weight losses associated with monopolistic output re-
strictions in standard monopoly theory are not the only welfare losses
incurred through the franchising process. The substitution of political
selection for consumer selection inevitably introduces economic ineffi-
ciencies because decisions are made by individuals who do not bear the
associated costs. Hence, costs induced by franchising must be added to
the dead weight costs traditionally associated with monopoly.
To quantify the various costs of political franchising is treacher-
ous, given the many necessary assumptions that must be employed
about a multitude of franchise variations. To assist in putting the
franchising discussion in appropriate perspective, however, it is helpful
to advance an estimate of the costs of local licensing of cable television.
Costs of public access and local origination programming: These costs
2. The regulation of prices has always been advanced by the advocates of monop-
oly franchises as the consumer's protection after market competition is foreclosed. "Lo-
cal governments typically protect their citizens from cable's monopoly power by regu-
lating rates for basic subscriber services, insuring access for users on a
nondiscriminatory basis, and setting minimum service standards." Miller & Beals, Reg-
ulating Cable Television, 57 WASH. L. REv. 85, 96 (1981).
"' See supra note 57.
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include payments for the establishment of production facilities, 33 excess
channel capacity, and direct grants to community organizations. They
have been estimated in the typical cable franchise case to equal $4.81
per subscriber per month by Ernst & Whinney, and $6.00 per sub-
scriber per month in the Denver, Colorado franchise, specifically, by
the Cable Television Information Center. 23 4 Since these studies pro-
jected far different average monthly revenues per subscriber ($22.45
versus $37.50, respectively), these estimates range from 22% to 16%,
respectively, of total cable revenue.23 5 Franchise fees, a direct and ex-
plicit cost of the franchising process, are not included in these estimates.
Costs of delays in awarding a franchise: Local regulators can impose
high penalties on consumers by their delays in choosing a franchisee. A
1982 Consumers' Research article noted one such instance. While the
chairman of the County Board of Supervisors in franchised Fairfax,
Virginia labeled neighboring Prince William County's free entry policy
a disaster, the magazine noted that "Prince William County citizens,
however, currently have cable services, as most Fairfax County resi-
dents do not. 236
What are the social costs of political delay? At a minimum, the
benefits of cable television reach the public after a delay of several
years, because cities typically devote between two and ten years to the
process of deciding upon a franchisee. 37 Consumer welfare analysis of
'3 In the South Central Los Angeles franchise competition, the winning bidder
promised to help program 21 public access and 8 government access channels by invest-
ing in 25 neighborhood production facilities that were to receive video production
equipment taking three and one-half pages to list. See Supplemental Report: Evalua-
tion and Recommendation of Highest Responsible Bidder for the Cable Television
Franchise in South Central Area of Los Angeles, attachment C at 11-15 (Sept. 17,
1981) (Los Angeles Dep't of Transp., Reference No. C.F. 78-5672, S1, S2).
23, See Ernst & Whinney, supra note 100, at 3; Touche Ross & Co., supra note
74, at 41.
231 See Ernst & Whinney, supra note 100, at 3; Touche Ross & Co., supra note
74, at 41.
2M6 Cable Could Compete, CONsuMRs' RES., Oct. 1982, at 22, 23. While studies
endorsing monopoly franchising often point to litigation problems occasionally exper-
ienced in multiple franchise jurisdictions, no consideration is given to delay problems
inherent in awarding exclusive franchises. Moreover, the easily available solution to
either set of problems is to dispense with franchises altogether by simply establishing an
open entry policy. Under such a policy, the local government sets fees and rules for
public uses that apply equally to all entrants, and the political delay is reduced to
virtually zero. It is also interesting to note that such studies find that competition spurs
cable construction, thus producing a double timing advantage to open entry policies.
22 For example, the Dallas franchisee secured approval of the city council and
completed construction of 50% of the city's cable system within three years. In contrast,
the process to select the franchisee for the East San Fernando Valley area of Los Ange-
les extended over more than five years, amid charges that city council members were
intentionally delaying the selection in order to collect campaign contributions from the
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the costs of franchising must take into account the time preferences of
consumers. The delay caused by the franchising process cannot be justi-
fied unless the additional benefits achieved through franchising out-
weigh the social costs to consumers of foregoing cable television services
during the selection process.238
Costs of political lobbying: It has been customary for large, nationally
integrated multiple system operators to establish locally-based subsidi-
aries for each new franchise contest, and to transfer 20% (or more) of
the subsidiary stock to politically influential local figures. 3 9 In addition
to assigning away at least 20% of anticipated profits, franchise bidders
often undertake large advertising, public relations, and lobbying cam-
paigns. 240 These campaigns entail significant expenses: typically these
costs (inclusive of stock awards) may amount to between 20% and 33%
of total profits. Estimating gross margin to be 13.68%,241 lobbying costs
are projected to total between $0.62 and $1.82 per subscriber per
month.
cable companies vying for the franchise. See Getlin, Council Postpones Cable TV Deci-
sion, L.A. Times, Feb. 16, 1983, at II-1, col. 4; Getlin, TV Cable Franchise Fight in
Valley is Longest-Running, L.A. Times, Jan. 17, 1983, at II-1, col. 4. Philadelphia
has had no less than four franchising processes since 1966 and still has not selected a
franchisee. See Cooke & Sutton, Goode Scraps Cable-TV Applications to Start Over,
Phila. Inquirer, Jan. 26, 1984, at 1-A, col. 1. Awareness of the potential for delays of
this sort has led those city councils particularly anxious for cable to let competition get
the job done.
288 Suppose, by way of example, that we attribute a three-year delay to the
franchising authority, a fair estimate of the average time delay, in that two years ap-
pears to be the lower bound and many franchising battles have lasted far longer. Dis-
counting at a real interest rate of 4% (below recent interest rates, but reasonable histor-
ically) means that whatever benefits cable brings to consumers will, measured
quantitatively, be worth only 88.9 cents on the dollar. The 11.1% loss is due to the time
preference of consumers-people choose to have good things sooner rather than later.
Perhaps a clearer way to view this loss is to note that the government franchising
agreement, to justify its benefits to consumers, would have to deliver a package that on
net (i.e., after the various costs of such regulation were subtracted) had a value to
consumers 12.5% greater than the unfranchised alternative. This political-haggling dis-
count suggests that slender or subtle advantages not easily demonstrable in existing data
make a very weak case for franchise monopoly.
"I See supra note 86.
240 See supra note 87. See also KINLEY, SIMPSON & ASSOCIATES, WESTERN
FRANCHISE REVIEW, Oct. 1985, at 6 (describing the proposed assignment of 45% of a
cable company's equity to the cable franchising authority).
"1 This figure is based on the average gross margin of all 34 publicly held domes-
tic cable operators, as given in 1982 industry data compiled by Communications Equity
Associates, in the CABLE TV FINANCIAL DATABOOK, June 1984, at 90.
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Table 3
Politically Imposed Costs of Franchise Monopoly*
(I) (II) (III) (IV) Total
Uneconomic Delaye Lobbying Franchise Costs
Investment Fees'
Low Estimate 4 .8 1c .97 .719 1.29 7.78
(percent of low (19%) (2 years) (20% of (5%) (30%)
revenue estimate gross
[25.83]) a  margin)
High 6 .0 0 d 2.72 1.71
h  1.88 12.31
Estimate (16%) (4 years) (33% of (5%) (33%)
(percent of high gross
revenue estimate margin)
[37.50])
b
Mid-Point 5.41 1.84 1.21 1.58 10.04
Estimate (17%) (5.8%) (3.8%) (5%) (32%)
(percent of mean
revenue estimate
[31.67])
a Ernst & Whinney, The Cost of Cable Television Regulatory & Franchise Requirements: A
Preliminary Analysis 47 (Apr. 1982) (unpublished study prepared for the National Cable Tele-
vision Association).
b Touche Ross & Co., Financial and Economic Analysis of the Cable Television Permit Policy of
the City and County of Denver 41 (Jan. 20, 1984) (unpublished study). This survey produced
the high estimate. Other estimates are consistent with these numbers. National Economic Re-
search Associates projected that a typical 10,000 home urban franchise would require an average
$6.09/mo./sub. in regulatory costs and franchise fees. (A projection for a 300,000 home urban
franchise fell to $4.29/mo./sub., but such size franchises are rare. National Economic Research
Associates, Costs of Cable Television Franchise Requirements 14, app. 1-2 (Feb. 14, 1984) (un-
published study prepared for the National Cable Television Associate)). In Sacramento, a
330,000 home franchise area, regulatory costs have been estimated at S7.48/mo./sub. using evi-
dence in Opening Brief for Plaintiff at 8, Pacific West Cable Co. v. City and County of Sacra-
mento, 798 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1986); Testimony of Jay Smith at exhibit 2 in id.
c Ernst & Whinney, supra note a, at 47.
d Touche Ross & Co., supra note b, at 41.
C "Delay" figures are based on an assumed real discount rate of 4% and a linear demand curve
with a slope equal to -1. We further assume that the cable firm sets the price where elasticity of
demand equals 1. (This is where the profit-maximizing firm would, in fact, set price if MC=O.)
The delay cost represents the difference between the average monthly consumer surplus (which,
given our assumed demand curve, equals one half the average monthly revenue) and the dis-
counted value of this surplus computed by dividing the average monthly consumer surplus by
(1.0 4 )n where n is the number of years over which the surplus is being discounted, in this case
the number of years consumers were forced to defer their enjoyment of cable television while
waiting for the franchise process to run its course. Here we ignore any producer losses emanat-
ing from franchise delay.
fThe figures in this column are derived from determining the gross profit of a cable company
(which, for the purposes of this table is assumed to be 13.68% of total revenues, the national
average for the 34 publicly held U.S. cable companies operating in 1983, see Community Equity
Associates, THE CABLE TV FINANCIAL DATABOOK 90 (June 1984), and then computing a dol-
lar value representing the percentage of gross profits devoted to securing the franchise through
advertising, promotion, campaign contributions, etc.
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g The 20% figure is a low estimate of total lobbying cost, representing the typical percentage of a
cable company's stock granted without equity contributions to local community organizations.
See supra note 75.
h Although a cable company bidding for a franchise in Santa Cruz, California recently proposed
that 45% of its equity be given to the city and county franchising authority, see KINLEY, SIMP-
SON & ASSOCIATES, WESTERN FRANCHISE REVIEW, Oct. 1985, at 6, a more realistic high
"guesstimate" would be 33%.
'The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 sets a 5% ceiling on franchise fees. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 542(b) (Supp. 111 1985).
* As stated in the text, this table is not presented as a definitive measurement of the political costs
of cable franchising but is offered for illustrative purposes in our discussion of the net effects of
government franchising. All figures in table are in dollars per subscriber per month, unless
otherwise noted.
Table 3 presents the estimated political costs of franchising 42 and
demonstrates that they are significant.24 Given reasonable inferences, it
is likely that costs imposed on cable consumers and suppliers approxi-
mate one-third of total revenue, or more than twice the amount of pre-
tax profit.
Finally, consumers have a clear interest in flexibility should a new
entrepreneur or a new technology appear capable of providing im-
proved service. In an industry as dynamic as modem telecommunica-
tions, any practice that binds consumers to a long-term exclusive deal-
ing arrangement, as does franchising, has the potential to impose
significant disadvantages." 4' The idealized case for monopoly franchis-
ing, even if it could be complemented by a proven record of demonstra-
ble consumer benefits, must confront the costliness of the lack of choice
in contracting. Regulatory boards inevitably become wedded to the
firms and technologies they regulate and are likely to attempt to thwart
the very innovation that would hurt the natural or legal monopolists
that the boards are charged to regulate. Judge Posner has identified
142 These cost estimates are not intended to be precise measures of politically im-
posed costs, but simply reasonable calculations pointing to the order of magnitude in-
volved in costly cable regulation. Such projections under uncertainty must be made in
any forthright assessment of the net benefits of franchise monopoly.
'4 Both economic costs from output restriction, and X-inefficiency, or dynamic
costs incurred when entrepreneurial innovation is denied consumers of franchise mo-
nopoly, are excluded from this analysis.
244 As one study notes:
Electronics and information technology have evolved enormously over
the last three decades. There is every indication that this evolution will
continue for at least one or two more decades. Neither cable television nor
its competitors are yet fully developed. At best, we have only a sketchy and
limited view of the structure of the communications future. If we look
back only a decade to the Sloan Commission and the Rostow reports, we
see no mention of multichannel MDS as a competitor to cable. Neither
report discusses fibre optics-naturally enough, since practical fibre optics
communications systems had yet to be invented.
Shooshan, Jackson, & Kahn, supra note 189, at 42-43 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 134:1335
PRIVATE MONOPOLY AND CABLE TELEVISION
this reality of regulation as the central issue in the analysis of monop-
oly franchising:
It is quite true that at any point the case for regulation is
stronger in some regulated industries than in others, depend-
ing on the degree to which conditions of natural monopoly
are actually present. But natural monopoly conditions are
quite likely to be transient. . . .Communications is a con-
temporary example of an industry undergoing rapid techno-
logical changes that are apparently opening up a host of new
competitive opportunities. In general, the tempo of change in
the economy seems to be increasing. The most pernicious
feature of regulation would appear to be precisely its impact
on change-its tendency to retard the growth of competition
that would erode the power of regulated monopolists. To
embrace regulation because an industry is today a natural
monopoly and seems likely to remain so is to gamble danger-
ously with the future. To impose regulation on the basis of a
prophecy that the industry will remain monopolistic forever
may be to make the prophecy self-fulfilling. 4"
The record of economists and regulators in abstractly identifying
candidates for natural monopoly regulation is concededly poor. As re-
cently as 1978, a leading analyst of the telecommunications industry
could calmly state, "The most difficult cases for deregulation come in
the long distance telephone and terminal equipment markets, with their
blends of monopoly and competition. Here, it may not be feasible for
government regulation simply to disappear. In any event, it is unlikely
that it will disappear soon.'" 246 The subsequent development of compe-
tition in the long-distance telephone market looms as an ominous prece-
dent to those who argue that the operator of a cable television franchise
enjoys a natural monopoly.24 7 The cable industry, beset by competitive
pressures in the short and the long run, demonstrates nervousness un-
characteristic of an entrenched natural monopolist:
[F]ear persists about the long-term competition [that small
backyard satellite dishes] and other technologies pose for
245 Posner, supra note 63, at 636.
248 Besen, Deregulating Telecommunications-Sorting Out Mixed Signals, RFG-
ULATION, Mar./Apr. 1978, at 30, 36.
24' As Bruce Owen, a leading telecommunications analyst, has written: "Ironi-
cally, the econometric evidence in favor of the idea that there was a natural monopoly
in the long distance telephone business, a business now generally accepted to be at least
workably competitive, was probably stronger than the evidence suggesting that cable is
a natural monopoly." Owen, supra note 71, at 5.
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cable. Cable operators worry about the "trolley car syn-
drome, the fear that the thousands of miles of cable that have
been strung in the last 30 years might go the way of the
thousands of miles of trolley car tracks that once criss-
crossed the country if some new technology comes along that
makes cable obsolete.
248
CONCLUSION
In this era of federal deregulation, the arguable efficiency rationale
for franchising has vanished because regulators can no longer suppress
rates in order to prompt the expansion of output. In its standard for-
mulation, the problem posed by monopoly is that, where ready substi-
tutes are unavailable, a firm can maximize profit by restricting output
to below the competitive level, thereby driving prices above costs. A
cable firm, for instance, can restrict output by lowering penetration.
The inefficiency of monopoly is that the marginal consumers who are
driven from the market by the monopolistic restriction of supply are
willing to pay the opportunity cost of additional production, but are
foreclosed from doing so by the monopolist's quest for excess returns.
There are two predictable consequences of a monopolistic restric-
tion.249 First, the monopolist makes X more from those customers A
who are willing to consume at either competitive or monopoly prices.
These consumers must pay prices that are higher by precisely the
amount that the monopolist gains. These payments constitute a pure
transfer, so far as the analysis goes, from A consumers to the monopo-
list. Because the dollar gains of one party are exactly offset by the dol-
lar losses of another, no positive economic judgments are obvious. Sec-
ond, the efficiency concern with monopoly centers on what happens to
marginal customers B when the monopolist establishes a price above
costs Pmono- The difference between what those customers are willing
to pay for incremental units of output, minus the opportunity cost of
producing those units (demand - marginal cost) is the consumers' sur-
plus Y lost by the monopolistic restriction. These losses are not offset by
corresponding gains to any party and are therefore labeled deadweight
loss in economic analysis; they form the basis of the positive or "scien-
tific" argument against monopoly in the economics literature. The pres-
ence of such losses demonstrates that monopoly, while generating both
248 Solomon, supra note 216, at 2482 (quoting Thomas P. Southwick, editor of
Multichannel News).
24 This graphical analysis may illuminate the explanation, although the text may
be read on its own by simply ignoring the bold letter references.
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gains for the monopolist and losses for consumers, creates more of the
latter. Hence, even a neutral analyst may conclude that monopoly
yields a net loss in social welfare and thus may condemn it as economi-
cally inefficient.
In the context of rate deregulation, this analysis clarifies the in-
quiry into the economic effects of cable franchising. If rates were regu-
lated, an economic debate on the relative costs and benefits of regulated
franchises would be in order to determine whether local regulation low-
ers prices enough so as to expand output sufficiently and thereby justify
the costs to society of imposing such regulation. This would rest on a
complex, empirical inquiry. Now, however, the cable market faces no
such regulatory trade-off. With unregulated pricing for basic and pre-
mium programming, a monopoly franchise confers protection from
competition without guaranteeing any offsetting constraint on rates.
The "deregulated .franchise monopoly" emerges as a curious creature of
public policy, in that the most that a perfectly informed and properly
motivated city council could accomplish would be to transfer monopoly
profits from supplier to city government. If a local government were
Price/Cost (S)
P mono
P comp MC=A.
Demand
Marginal RevenueI I
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simply to accept the highest monetary bid for its cable franchise,2 50 it
would be engaged only in a transfer of monopoly rents. This transfer
produces no economic efficiency, and, in a real world setting, must ac-
tually introduce specific sources of inefficiency:
(1) The cable firm and cable products selected by the local govern-
ment will differ from what consumers would select in a free competi-
tion for their patronage. Government's knowledge of what consumers
prefer is inherently bounded; much information about consumer prefer-
ences is incommunicable outside the context of market rivalry. More-
over, political selections are dramatically biased toward the desires of
interest groups who aim to supply, or otherwise profit from, the
franchise. Such interest groups realize no positive net reward in faith-
fully representing consumer interests.
(2) The franchising process is expensive. It. delays delivery of cable
services to consumers. It promotes costly political competitions in which
lobbying efforts consume significant real resources.
(3) The franchiser may not accept cash payments from the fran-
chisee in excess of 5% of gross receipts.2"' As a result, the winning
auction bid must be paid in cash and in concessions from the cable
operator. Such concessions often result in inefficient allocations of re-
sources. Excess channel and programming capacity, extensive and un-
derutilized local origination facilities, and an imaginative array of com-
munity improvement payments all represent investments that cost
suppliers more to provide than they are worth to consumers.
(4) Assuming, arguendo, that natural monopoly cost conditions ex-
ist, legal monopoly adds an additional entry barrier to the economic
barriers already present, thereby increasing the likelihood, magnitude,
and duration of monopolistic output restrictions.2 52
All four of these sources of inefficiency are significant25 and pro-
vide a straightforward economic calculus. Because the argument for
monopoly franchises must now be grounded solely on redistributional
advantages and because monopoly predictably generates considerable
welfare losses, a positive analysis must reject the monopoly franchise
250 Highest monetary bid means highest in terms of present value.
251 The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 sets a 5% ceiling on franchise
fees. See supra note 85. If cities truly believed cable firms to be homogeneous natural
monopolists, they would have no reason to franchise. They could collect by simply
imposing a tax of 5% of gross revenues on all entrants. A natural monopoly would
quickly be established by market competition and the maximum legal transfer to the
government would still be extracted.
252 Judge Posner clearly articulated this aspect of the inefficiency caused by
franchising. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
252 See table 3, supra p. 1402.
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for the cable television industry. On efficiency grounds, the cable televi-
sion monopoly franchise is a net loss to society.
The argument currently made by proponents of monopoly
franchising reveals the disadvantages of such franchising. The argu-
ment asserts that selection of the inevitable cable monopolist by a local
government will produce a better cable system than selection by the
open marketplace. Supporters of this argument claim that "[i]n the ab-
sence of carefully defined franchise requirements and a competitive
franchising process, it is unlikely that cable systems will be used to
their fullest potential,"' ' and that "[tihe public's right to universal ser-
vice and a diversity of opinion is best served by the traditional franchise
system.
'255
It is essential to see that advocating exclusive cable franchising on
the ground that politically selected and legally protected monopolists
will be better quality providers is not a natural monopoly argument,
but a plea for monopoly creation based on the premise that a politically
franchised choice will be superior to a competitive, consumer choice. In
fact, this argument clearly contradicts the pro forma natural monopoly
case that sees the issue of product quality as an insignificant choice
between identical firms. Where suppliers do offer importantly different
packages, the political regulation of a natural monopoly does not follow
from the demonstration of natural monopoly cost conditions, because
there exists no reliable political mechanism for determining which nat-
ural monopolist is best in economic terms.
For cities to argue, then, that their franchisees are better cable
operators than those which might survive a competition for the market
is to contradict the assertion of natural monopoly. The franchising of
vast 120-channel systems with two-way interactive capabilities, along
with massive commitments to subsidize all manner of politically profit-
able projects and programming services for which little or no consumer
demand exists, may indeed be made possible by a rigorous competition
for the monopoly that the exclusive franchise fosters. This, however, is
not an innocent proconsumer solution of the natural monopoly prob-
lem, but the overruling of consumer selection by political fiat.
254 Pols, Why Cable-TV Monopolies Make Sense, L.A. Times, Jan. 3, 1983, at II-
5, col. 2 (view of Cynthia Pols, cable analyst for the National League of Cities).
215 Finneran, Local Monopolies Serve the Public Best, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17,
1985, at F-2, cols. 3, 6 (view of William B. Finneran, chairman of New York Commis-
sion on Cable Television).
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